

# EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

## PUBLIC

<b>Title:</b>	Sovereign Wealth Fund – Establishment of.
<b>Paper Number:</b>	76/26
<b>Date:</b>	24 March 2026
<b>Responsible Director:</b>	Financial Secretary
<b>Report Author:</b>	Financial Secretary
<b>Portfolio Holder:</b>	MLA Jack Ford
<b>Reason for paper:</b>	This paper is submitted to Executive Council:  For policy update/information
<b>Publication:</b>	Yes
<b>Previous papers:</b>	None
<b>List of Documents:</b>	Appendix A – Preliminary Project Plan and Timetable Appendix B – Santiago Principles

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### 1. Recommendations

Honourable Members are recommended:

- (a) To approve that work is undertaken to establish a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) using the principles outlined by the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF)<sup>1</sup> as the basis for such a fund.
- (b) To note that the legal structure, governance, investment decisions, use of monies within the SWF and required legislation will be subject to further ExCo approvals as part of the overall policy work to establish the fund.

### 2. Additional Budgetary Implications

2.1. None

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.ifswf.org/>

### **3. Executive Summary**

- 3.1. The development of a Hydrocarbon Industry in the Falkland Islands offers the opportunity to receive significant royalty income with estimates of c. US\$2 billion over the 30 years of phase 1 & 2 of the Northern Development area.
- 3.2. Many nations that have exploited their natural resources have set up Sovereign Wealth Funds using these revenues. The core aim of a SWF is to preserve and grow the nation's wealth over time to ensure economic and financial stability benefitting future generations.
- 3.3. The SWF will be set up and managed by the government. The governance of the fund, use of amounts held in the fund, investment principles and legislation required to ensure correct management and oversight of the fund will be developed and agreed through ExCo as the process progresses through the various stages.
- 3.4. The IFSWF developed a set of 24 principles in 2008 commonly known as the 'Santiago Principles' which act as a global benchmark for responsible governance and management of a SWF. It is against these principles that the Falkland Islands SWF would be created and governed.
- 3.5. An outline project plan and timetable has been produced for the creation of the SWF. The timetable outlined is indicative and open to change depending on the workstreams being undertaken and progress made by Navitas in reaching first oil and royalty payment.
- 3.6. The recommendation contained within this paper is that Members authorise the various workstreams necessary to create the SWF to begin.

### **4. Background**

- 4.1. It is common for many countries that receive significant revenue from the extraction of their natural resources to create a SWF into which these monies are paid. The oldest SWF is the Kuwait Investment Authority which was established in 1953 to manage oil revenues and safeguard the country's future.
- 4.2. In general, SWF have a specified purpose or purposes which are defined for the fund which cover:
  - Stabilisation of funds
  - Future generation of funds
  - Public pension reserves
  - Strategic Development
  - Specifically targeted industry funds (either emerging or distressed)

The core aim of a SWF is to preserve and grow the nation's wealth over time to ensure economic and financial stability benefitting future generations.

- 4.3. MLA Lewis Clifton OBE put forward motion 03/26, to Legislative Assembly on 29<sup>th</sup> January 2026 "...this House calls on the Governor (in Council) to bring forward legislation for the establishment and management of a Sovereign Wealth Fund, before the end of the third year of this Assembly and, reports back to the Assembly at the earliest

opportunity after conducting an initial review of the principles to underpin the proposed Fund”.

- 4.4. An organisation exists called the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF). This is a voluntary organisation of global SWFs committed to working together and strengthening the community through dialogue, research and self-assessment.
- 4.5. The IFSWF has approximately 50 members at various stages of development and includes some of the largest SWFs. These include China Investment Corporation, Kuwait Investment Authority and Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. Around half of all SWF are members of the IFSWF.
- 4.6. Underpinning the IFSWF are the ‘Santiago Principles’ (Annex B). These principles are 24 voluntary guidelines for SWFs promoting transparency, good governance, accountability and prudent investment practices. Members of the IFSWF promote and maintain these principles and work to them or aspire to work to them depending on their stage of development.
- 4.7. The Santiago Principles aim to:
  - 4.7.1. **Ensure sound governance:** SWFs should have a clear legal framework, defined policy objectives, and a governance structure that provides operational controls, risk management, and accountability. The SWF is outside political control.
  - 4.7.2. **Promote transparency:** SWFs are encouraged to publicly disclose their legal basis, funding sources, investment policies, and statistical data.
  - 4.7.3. **Support financial stability:** By investing based on economic and financial criteria.
  - 4.7.4. **Encourage prudent investment practices:** Investments should be guided by risk and return considerations, ensuring that SWFs act as economically oriented entities.
- 4.8. The Santiago Principles serve as a global benchmark for responsible SWF management. It is against the Santiago Principles that any Falkland Island SWF will be set up and governed.
- 4.9. Contact has been made with the IFSWF regards becoming a member and what support they may offer. A constructive conversation was had where they offered support to us in our development of a SWF, recommended other bodies to contact that would also be of assistance including the Commonwealth Institute and identified several existing SWF that we could approach to get specific information on their journey including Guyana, Sarawak (Malaysia), Shetland Islands and Papua New Guinea who have just set theirs up.
- 4.10. An ExCo paper was drafted in 2019 titled Establishing a Sovereign Wealth Fund but this was never presented. It is unknown why this was not done.
- 4.11. To examine the setting up of a SWF an FIG working committee has been initially set up with representation from the Legal, Natural Resources, Policy and Treasury departments.

Also included is representation from PMCL as they have experience of SWFs namely the Norwegian fund.

- 4.12. A provisional project plan and outline timetable (Annex A) has been produced detailing the required steps to be taken to properly set up a SWF based on the Santiago principles. The timetable is based on the latest expectation of first oil from Navitas.

## 5. Options

- 5.1. **Option 1 – Do not approve the work to set up a SWF and have royalties paid into existing funds.** This is not recommended.
- 5.2. **Option 2 – Approve work to set up a SWF with associated governance and legislation.** This is recommended.
- 5.3. **Option 3 – Set up a SWF with limited governance.** This is not recommended,

## 6. Consultation

- 6.1. An internal FIG working committee has been initially set up with representation from the Legal, Natural Resources, Policy and Treasury departments. Also included is representation from PMCL as they have experience of SWF namely the Norwegian fund. As part of the outline plan and timetable, there will be public engagement and consultation.
- 6.2. Contact has been made with the IFSWF regards becoming a member and what support they may offer. A constructive conversation was had where they offered support to us in our development of a SWF, recommended other bodies to contact that would also be of assistance including the Commonwealth Institute and also identified several existing SWF that we could approach to get specific information on their journey including Guyana, Sarawak (Malaysia), Shetland Islands and Papua New Guinea who have just set theirs up.

## 7. Resource Implications

- 7.1. Financial Implications: None from the setting up of the SWF. The investment strategy will be determined by a future ExCo paper when the objectives and uses of the fund have been agreed.
- 7.2. Human Resource Implications: None
- 7.3. Other Resource Implications: None

## 8. Legal and Legislative Implications

- 8.1. Specific Sovereign Wealth Fund legislation will need to be drafted to put into law the governance and use of the funds once agreed. This will be necessary to ensure that the funds are managed correctly and only used for agreed purposes to safeguard the long-term benefit of the fund for future generations of the Falkland Islands.

## **9. Equalities and Human Rights Implications**

9.1. None from the setting up of the SWF.

## **10. Environmental & Sustainability Implications**

10.1. None from the setting up of the SWF.

## **11. Camp Implications**

11.1. None from the setting up of the SWF.

## **12. Significant Risks**

12.1. The most significant risk is that work is undertaken to set up a SWF in anticipation of first oil and royalty receipts, however, this does not happen for whatever reason.

## **13. Publicity**

13.1. A response to the motion by MLA Lewis Clifton will be given in Legislative Assembly informing that Executive Council has approved work to begin on the creation of a SWF along with all the required legislation. As part of that response the public consultation will be referenced as included in the outline project plan.

## **14. Reasons for Recommending Preferred Option**

14.1. To ensure that the revenue received from the hydrocarbon royalties are managed correctly and only used for agreed purposes to safeguard the long-term benefit of future generations of the Falkland Islands, it is essential that the SWF is set up and managed correctly with all necessary legislation in place.

14.2. The legislation and governance structure will ensure that funds are only used for the prescribed purposes and will be outside of political control.

**PROJECT PLAN PROPOSAL - LEGISLATION FOR INCLUSION ON FIG'S LEGISLATION PROGRAMME 2024-25**

<b>1 - Directorate:</b>	Treasury lead with Mineral Resources and DPECS support
<b>2 - Project name:</b>	Sovereign Wealth Fund
<b>3 - Project aim:</b>	To establish out a statutory governance structure for Sovereign Wealth Fund to safeguard, manage, invest, and distribute revenues from oil royalties and direct corporate tax.
<b>4 - Directorate resources to deliver project within planned timetable:</b>	<p>SWF working group consisting of: Financial secretary (Project manager), External Consultant, Attorney General, Director of Natural Resources, Director of Policy Economy and Corporate Services, Strategic Financial Adviser, Project Support &amp; Admin Manager (Mineral Resources), and Head of Policy.</p> <p><b>Project management and oversight – Treasury</b></p> <p><b>Project Support:</b> DMR</p> <p><b>Policy advice – All</b></p> <p><b>Policy development and drafting instructions – DPECS/DMR with support from rest of group as required</b></p> <p><b>Consultation – DPECS</b></p> <p><b>Drafting – Legal Services</b></p>
<b>5 - Existing legislation:</b>	<a href="#">Finance and Audit Ordinance 1988</a> establishes duties and responsibilities in how public finances are managed and scrutinised. Section 11 establishes requirements for Special Funds, including Secretary of State approval.
<b>6 - Amend existing legislation:</b>	TBD
<b>7 - New legislation:</b>	<p>Sovereign Wealth Fund Ordinance. Legislation setting out governance structure for Sovereign Wealth Fund to safeguard, manage, invest, and distribute revenues from oil royalties and direct corporate tax.</p> <p>Subsidiary regulations covering specific rules</p>
<b>8 - Case for inclusion in FIG's Legislation Programme</b>	Identified as a high priority by motion passed at Legislative Assembly. Paper going to ExCo March 24

**HIGH LEVEL PROJECT PLAN AND TIMETABLE\*\*:**

PROJECT STAGE	LEAD OFFICER/ OTHER STAFF RESPONSIBLE FOR CARRYING OUT PROJECT STAGE WORK	ESTIMATED TIMEFRAME	ESTIMATED START DATE (or target ExCo/ Assembly meeting date)
<b>A - Identification of legislative issue:</b> <i>[consideration of issue and options - including alternatives to legislation; stakeholder engagement/initial consultation/legal advice sought]</i>	Ongoing		
<b>B - Obtain Executive Council approval:</b>	Financial Secretary currently drafting ExCo paper.	1 month	March 2026
<b>C - Detailed policy development:</b>	DPECS/DMR to start post ExCo Approval seeking support from team as required.  Policy issues to cover: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Purpose and objectives</li> <li>- Governance &amp; structure</li> <li>- Funding</li> <li>- Investment mandate and rules</li> <li>- Distribution/ spending rules and aims</li> <li>- Transparency and reporting</li> <li>- Audit &amp; Oversight</li> <li>- Amendment procedures</li> </ul>	8 months	April 2026
<b>D - Consultation on detailed policy:</b> <i>[as necessary, on detailed policy with portfolio holders/ stakeholders/ wider population]</i>	Members, FCDO. Public consultation on proposed way forward.	4 months	January 2027
<b>E - Revision of detailed policy:</b> <i>[as necessary, following consultation include policy development to fill identified gaps]</i>	DPECS/DMR. May be shortened depending on required changes	2 months	May 2027
<b>F - Obtain Executive Council approval:</b> <i>[of detailed policy for legislation; and for issue of drafting instructions to Head of Legislation Services]</i>		1 month	July 2027
<b>G - Production and delivery of drafting instructions:</b> <i>[to Head of Legislation Services]</i>	Opportunity to overlap with policy refinement and approval, particularly non-contentious issues	5 months	August 2027
<b>H - Legislative drafting:</b> <i>[including internal quality processes - consult with Legislation team about an estimated timeframe for legislative drafting]</i>		12 -18 months	January 2028

<b>I - Consultation on draft legislation:</b> [as necessary]			2 months	January - June 2029
<b>J - Obtain Executive Council approval:</b> [of draft legislation including implementation plan and for submission of any Bill to Legislative Assembly]			1 months	March 2029 – August 2029
<b>K - Legislative Assembly approval of Bill***:</b> [including Select Committee scrutiny]			1 month	May 2029 – November 2029
<b>L - Commencement:</b> [including implementation; guidance; forms etc]				2030
Proposed:	[Name]	[Project Team Leader]	Date:	
Approved:	[Name]	[Director]	Date:	

NOTES:

\*Officers should give full consideration whether Directorate resources can take this project forward to reach the stage when legislative drafting will begin by June 2025. If the project is unlikely to result in legislative drafting until 2025-26, the project can be submitted for a placeholder in the 2025-26 Legislation Programme (but similar project planning information should be provided).

\*\*Project Plan stages can be combined/condensed in simple projects or expanded/added to for complex projects - but the **core** project stages must be included in the plan or the project risks not being recommended for inclusion on FIG's Legislation Programme 2024-25.

\*\*\*Stage not required for secondary legislation.

IWG

INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS

# Sovereign Wealth Funds

Generally Accepted  
Principles and Practices

“Santiago Principles”

October 2008

IWG

INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS

# Sovereign Wealth Funds

Generally Accepted  
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October 2008



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# Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADIA	Abu Dhabi Investment Authority
CEO	Chief executive officer
CIC	China Investment Corporation
GAPP	Generally accepted principles and practices
GIC	Government of Singapore Investment Corporation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMFC	International Monetary and Financial Committee
IWG	International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds
KIA	Kuwait Investment Authority
KIC	Korea Investment Cooperation
LIA	Libyan Investment Authority
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
QIA	Qatar Investment Authority
SOE	State-owned enterprise
SWF	Sovereign wealth fund
UAE	United Arab Emirates



# Introduction

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have recently been recognized as well-established institutional investors and important participants in the international monetary and financial system. This was highlighted by the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) when, in October 2007, it expressed the need for further analysis of key issues for investors and recipients of SWF flows, including a dialogue on identifying best practices.<sup>1</sup>

The International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) was established at a meeting of countries with SWFs on April 30–May 1, 2008, in Washington, D.C. In the meeting, it was agreed that the IWG would initiate the process, facilitated and coordinated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Hamad Al Hurr Al Suwaidi, Undersecretary of Abu Dhabi Finance Department, and Jaime Caruana, Director of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department of the IMF, were selected to co-chair the IWG.

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<sup>1</sup>The IMFC is a committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), comprising representatives—typically ministers of finance and central bank governors—of all 185 IMF member countries.

The IWG comprises 26 IMF member countries with SWFs.<sup>2</sup> The IWG met on three occasions—in Washington, D.C., Singapore, and Santiago (Chile)—to identify and draft a set of generally accepted principles and practices (GAPP) that properly reflects their investment practices and objectives, and agreed on the Santiago Principles at its third meeting. A subgroup of the IWG—chaired by David Murray, Chairman of the Australian Future Fund Board of Guardians—was also formed to carry forward the technical drafting work. The drafting group met on three occasions—in Oslo (Norway), Singapore, and Santiago—to draft the GAPP. In carrying out its work, the IWG used the findings of the IMF-commissioned voluntary SWF Survey<sup>3</sup> on current structures and practices, and drew from

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<sup>2</sup>IWG member countries are Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Canada, Chile, China, Equatorial Guinea, Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Singapore, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. Permanent observers of the IWG are Oman, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, the OECD, and the World Bank. For a complete set of countries and associated representatives, see Appendix II.

<sup>3</sup>See *Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Survey of Current Institutional and Operational Practices*. Available via the Internet: [www.iwg-swf.org/pub.htm](http://www.iwg-swf.org/pub.htm).

## INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS

related international principles and practices that have already gained wide acceptance in related areas.

The IWG also benefited from input from a number of recipient countries—Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States—as well as

from the European Commission,<sup>4</sup> the OECD, and the World Bank. The IMF facilitated and coordinated the IWG's work, and acted as the IWG secretariat (see Appendix II)

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<sup>4</sup>At the IWG, the European Commission is acting on behalf of the European Union, as agreed by the European Council on March 14, 2008.

Hamad Al Hurr Al Suwaidi  
*IWG Co-Chair and Undersecretary,*  
Abu Dhabi Finance Department

Jaime Caruana  
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October 2008

# Santiago Principles: Objective and Purpose

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are special-purpose investment funds or arrangements that are owned by the general government.<sup>5,6</sup> Created by the general government for macro-economic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies that include investing in foreign financial assets.<sup>7</sup> SWFs have diverse legal, institutional, and governance structures. They are a heterogeneous group, comprising fiscal stabilization funds, savings funds, reserve investment corporations, development funds, and pension reserve funds without explicit pension liabilities. Appendix I discusses the definition of an SWF in more detail, and Appendix III contains short descriptions of SWFs in the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG).

As well-established institutional investors, SWFs have been undertaking cross-border investing for many years. Their investments have helped promote growth, prosperity, and

economic development in capital-exporting and -receiving countries. In their home countries, SWFs are institutions of central importance in helping to improve the management of public finances and achieve macroeconomic stability, and in supporting high-quality growth. SWFs also bring substantial benefits to the global markets. Their ability in many circumstances to take a long-term view in their investments and ride out business cycles brings important diversity to the global financial markets, which can be extremely beneficial, particularly during periods of financial turmoil or macroeconomic stress.

Recently the rapid accumulation of foreign assets in some countries has resulted in the growing number and size of SWFs. Various projections suggest that their presence in international capital markets is set to increase further. As a result of the SWFs' increasing level of assets invested in public and private equity holdings, they are exercising greater influence on corporate governance practices.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>General government includes both central government and subnational government.

<sup>6</sup>These exclude, *inter alia*, foreign currency reserve assets held by monetary authorities for the traditional balance of payments or monetary policy purposes, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the traditional sense, government-employee pension funds, or assets managed for the benefit of individuals.

<sup>7</sup>SWFs are commonly established out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports.

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<sup>8</sup>Although SWFs may still be relatively small in comparison with total global financial assets, they are significant relative to both mature market stock market capitalization and emerging market economies' debt and capital markets. According to market sources, the estimated size of SWFs is US\$2–\$3 trillion, while according to the IMF *Global Financial Stability Report*, October 2007, page 139, total global financial assets are estimated at US\$190 trillion, mature market stock market capitalization at US\$39.2 trillion, and emerging market economies' debt and capital markets at US\$17.8 trillion.

The IWG recognizes that SWF investments are both beneficial and critical to international markets. For that purpose, it will be important to continue to demonstrate—to home and recipient countries, and the international financial markets—that the SWF arrangements are properly set up and investments are made on an economic and financial basis. The generally accepted principles and practices (GAPP), therefore, is underpinned by the following guiding objectives for SWFs:

- i. To help maintain a stable global financial system and free flow of capital and investment;
- ii. To comply with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements in the countries in which they invest;
- iii. To invest on the basis of economic and financial risk and return-related considerations; and
- iv. To have in place a transparent and sound governance structure that provides for adequate operational controls, risk management, and accountability.

### Purpose

The purpose of the GAPP is to identify a framework of generally accepted principles and practices that properly reflect appropriate governance and accountability arrangements as well as the conduct of investment practices by SWFs on a prudent and sound basis. Elements of the GAPP have been drawn from a review of existing SWF practices used in a number of countries and a distillation of principles and practices applicable to SWF activities that are already in use in other international fora (see reference list on page 49). Making the GAPP known will help to increase understanding of SWFs to home and recipient countries and the international financial markets. The GAPP also seeks to ensure that through the pursuit of these principles and practices, SWFs continue to bring economic and financial benefits to

home countries, recipient countries, and the international financial system.

The GAPP aims at supporting the institutional framework, governance, and investment operations of SWFs that are guided by their policy purpose and objectives, and consistent with a sound macroeconomic policy framework. Publication of the GAPP should help improve understanding of SWFs as economically and financially oriented entities in both the home and recipient countries. This understanding aims to contribute to the stability of the global financial system, reduce protectionist pressures, and help maintain an open and stable investment climate. The GAPP would also enable SWFs, especially newly established ones, to develop, review, or strengthen their organization, policies, and investment practices.<sup>9</sup>

To ensure success of the GAPP, a constructive and collaborative response from the recipient countries will be essential. The IWG is of the view that the GAPP, together with the OECD's guidance for recipient countries,<sup>10</sup> will help achieve the shared goal of maintaining a stable and open investment environment. Increased transparency—both by the SWFs on their structure and

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<sup>9</sup>It is understood that application of some or all of the GAPP may not be relevant or appropriate to the extent of SWFs' domestic assets.

<sup>10</sup>The OECD Investment Committee has adopted a report on recipient country policies in relation to SWFs, which was endorsed by OECD ministers in early June 2008. See OECD Investment Committee Report, April 4, 2008: "The OECD will continue its work on how governments can maintain their commitment to open international investment policies—including for SWFs—while also protecting essential security interests. The resulting framework will foster mutually-beneficial situations where SWFs enjoy fair treatment in the markets of recipient countries and these countries can confidently resist protectionism pressures."

operations, and by recipient countries on their investment screening processes and equal treatment of investors—is one of the key factors in achieving this shared goal.

### Nature

The GAPP is a voluntary set of principles and practices that the members of the IWG support and either have implemented or aspire to implement. The GAPP denotes general practices and principles, which are potentially achievable by countries at all levels of economic development. The GAPP is subject to provisions of intergovernmental agreements, and legal and regulatory requirements. Thus, the implementation of each principle of the GAPP is subject to applicable home country laws.

The principles and practices laid out in the GAPP, along with their explanatory notes, can be expected to guide existing and future SWFs in various aspects of their activities—most importantly investing professionally in accordance with their investment policy objectives—and to help inform any associated legal and institutional reform. As investment institutions, SWFs operate on a good faith basis, and invest on the basis of economic and financial risk and return-related considerations. In doing so, they comply with applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements in their home countries and in the countries in which they invest.

### Structure

The GAPP covers practices and principles in three key areas. These include (i) legal framework, objectives, and coordination with macroeconomic policies; (ii) institutional framework and governance structure; and (iii) investment and risk management framework. Sound practices and principles in the first area underpin a robust institutional framework and governance structure of the SWF, and facilitate formulation of appropriate investment strategies consistent with the SWF's stated policy objectives. A sound

governance structure that separates the functions of the owner, governing body(ies), and management facilitates operational independence in the management of the SWF to pursue investment decisions and investment operations free of political influence. A clear investment policy shows an SWF's commitment to a disciplined investment plan and practices. Also, a reliable risk management framework promotes the soundness of its investment operations and accountability.

This document consists of three parts—the GAPP (Part I); a discussion of the GAPP, where each GAPP principle and subprinciple has an accompanying explanatory note that provides the underlying rationale and objective for the principle in question, together with examples on how the principle has been implemented in some countries (Part II); and appendix and reference material, including a definition of SWFs, background information of SWFs represented in the IWG, and references to professional literature and other international standards and codes, parts of which are applicable to SWFs (Part III).

### Implementation and Review

The IWG recognizes the evolving nature of international capital flows, and the fact that some SWFs are still in the process of establishing their operations. Other forms of sovereign investment arrangements may still emerge. Therefore, especially for newer SWFs, the implementation of the GAPP (e.g., GAPPs 17 and 22) may be challenging and require an appropriate transitional period. For example, under GAPP 17, it is recognized that some newly established SWFs may require time to reach their desired long-term asset allocation and related performance standards and to be able to disclose the relevant information indicated in this principle. For these SWFs, there are different time frames in which this can be completed, reflecting the different investment objectives, strategies, and time horizons implied by the particular

strategic asset allocation strategy. For others, which may already be following well-established practices, the GAPP may be considered as setting a minimum standard. However, the GAPP is formulated broadly enough so that underlying principles and practices can be accommodated in different institutional, constitutional, and legal settings existing in various countries.

The IWG also recognizes that several aspects of the GAPP could benefit from further study and work, such as those relating to the provision of comprehensive and reliable information about past, present, and future activities of an SWF, and potential risks to investment operations and SWF balance sheets. Likewise, as the macroeconomic and financial stability implications of SWF investments change and SWF practices

develop, some aspects of the GAPP may need re-examination. Continuing coordination and consultation at the international level also could be desirable on issues of common interest to the SWFs.

To facilitate this, the IWG has agreed to explore the establishment of a standing group of SWFs. This group would be able to keep the GAPP under review, as appropriate, and facilitate the dissemination, proper understanding, and implementation of the GAPP. The standing group also would provide SWFs with a continuing forum for exchanging ideas and views among themselves and with recipient countries. The group could also examine ways through which aggregated information on SWF operations could be periodically collected, made available, and explained.

# Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP)—Santiago Principles

In furtherance of the “Objective and Purpose,” the IWG members either have implemented or intend to implement the following principles and practices, on a voluntary basis, *each of which is subject to* home country laws, regulations, requirements and obligations. This paragraph is an integral part of the GAPP.

## **GAPP 1. Principle**

The legal framework for the SWF should be sound and support its effective operation and the achievement of its stated objective(s).

*GAPP 1.1. Subprinciple.* The legal framework for the SWF should ensure legal soundness of the SWF and its transactions.

*GAPP 1.2. Subprinciple.* The key features of the SWF’s legal basis and structure, as well as the legal relationship between the SWF and other state bodies, should be publicly disclosed.

## **GAPP 2. Principle**

The policy purpose of the SWF should be clearly defined and publicly disclosed.

## **GAPP 3. Principle**

Where the SWF’s activities have significant direct domestic macroeconomic implications, those activities should be closely coordinated with the domestic fiscal and monetary authorities, so as to ensure consistency with the overall macroeconomic policies.

## **GAPP 4. Principle**

There should be clear and publicly disclosed policies, rules, procedures, or arrangements in relation to the SWF’s general approach to funding, withdrawal, and spending operations.

*GAPP 4.1. Subprinciple.* The source of SWF funding should be publicly disclosed.

*GAPP 4.2. Subprinciple.* The general approach to withdrawals from the SWF and spending on behalf of the government should be publicly disclosed.

## **GAPP 5. Principle**

The relevant statistical data pertaining to the SWF should be reported on a timely basis to the owner, or as otherwise required, for inclusion where appropriate in macroeconomic data sets.

## **GAPP 6. Principle**

The governance framework for the SWF should be sound and establish a clear and effective division of roles and responsibilities in order to facilitate accountability and operational independence in the management of the SWF to pursue its objectives.

## **GAPP 7. Principle**

The owner should set the objectives of the SWF, appoint the members of its governing body(ies) in accordance with clearly defined procedures, and exercise oversight over the SWF’s operations.

## **GAPP 8. Principle**

The governing body(ies) should act in the best interests of the SWF, and have a clear mandate and adequate authority and competency to carry out its functions.

## **GAPP 9. Principle**

The operational management of the SWF should implement the SWF’s strategies in an

independent manner and in accordance with clearly defined responsibilities.

**GAPP 10. Principle**

The accountability framework for the SWF's operations should be clearly defined in the relevant legislation, charter, other constitutive documents, or management agreement.

**GAPP 11. Principle**

An annual report and accompanying financial statements on the SWF's operations and performance should be prepared in a timely fashion and in accordance with recognized international or national accounting standards in a consistent manner.

**GAPP 12. Principle**

The SWF's operations and financial statements should be audited annually in accordance with recognized international or national auditing standards in a consistent manner.

**GAPP 13. Principle**

Professional and ethical standards should be clearly defined and made known to the members of the SWF's governing body(ies), management, and staff.

**GAPP 14. Principle**

Dealing with third parties for the purpose of the SWF's operational management should be based on economic and financial grounds, and follow clear rules and procedures.

**GAPP 15. Principle**

SWF operations and activities in host countries should be conducted in compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements of the countries in which they operate.

**GAPP 16. Principle**

The governance framework and objectives, as well as the manner in which the SWF's management is operationally independent from the owner, should be publicly disclosed.

**GAPP 17. Principle**

Relevant financial information regarding the SWF should be publicly disclosed to

demonstrate its economic and financial orientation, so as to contribute to stability in international financial markets and enhance trust in recipient countries.

**GAPP 18. Principle**

The SWF's investment policy should be clear and consistent with its defined objectives, risk tolerance, and investment strategy, as set by the owner or the governing body(ies), and be based on sound portfolio management principles.

*GAPP 18.1. Subprinciple.* The investment policy should guide the SWF's financial risk exposures and the possible use of leverage.

*GAPP 18.2. Subprinciple.* The investment policy should address the extent to which internal and/or external investment managers are used, the range of their activities and authority, and the process by which they are selected and their performance monitored.

*GAPP 18.3. Subprinciple.* A description of the investment policy of the SWF should be publicly disclosed.

**GAPP 19. Principle**

The SWF's investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns in a manner consistent with its investment policy, and based on economic and financial grounds.

*GAPP 19.1. Subprinciple.* If investment decisions are subject to *other than* economic and financial considerations, these should be clearly set out in the investment policy and be publicly disclosed.

*GAPP 19.2. Subprinciple.* The management of an SWF's assets should be consistent with what is generally accepted as sound asset management principles.

**GAPP 20. Principle**

The SWF should not seek or take advantage of privileged information or inappropriate influence by the broader government in competing with private entities.

**GAPP 21. Principle**

SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental element of their equity investments' value. If an SWF chooses to exercise its ownership rights, it should do so in a manner that is consistent with its investment policy and protects the financial value of its investments. The SWF should publicly disclose its general approach to voting securities of listed entities, including the key factors guiding its exercise of ownership rights.

**GAPP 22. Principle**

The SWF should have a framework that identifies, assesses, and manages the risks of its operations.

*GAPP 22.1. Subprinciple.* The risk management framework should include reliable information and timely reporting systems, which should enable the adequate monitoring

and management of relevant risks within acceptable parameters and levels, control and incentive mechanisms, codes of conduct, business continuity planning, and an independent audit function.

*GAPP 22.2. Subprinciple.* The general approach to the SWF's risk management framework should be publicly disclosed.

**GAPP 23. Principle**

The assets and investment performance (absolute and relative to benchmarks, if any) of the SWF should be measured and reported to the owner according to clearly defined principles or standards.

**GAPP 24. Principle**

A process of regular review of the implementation of the GAPP should be engaged in by or on behalf of the SWF.



# Discussion of the GAPP— Santiago Principles

In furtherance of the “Objective and Purpose,” the IWG members either have implemented or intend to implement the following principles and practices, on a voluntary basis, *each of which is subject to* home country laws, regulations, requirements, and obligations. This paragraph is an integral part of the GAPP.

## A. Legal Framework, Objectives, and Coordination with Macroeconomic Policies

### Legal basis and form

#### GAPP 1. Principle

**The legal framework for the SWF should be sound and support its effective operation and the achievement of its stated objective(s).<sup>11</sup>**

#### **Explanation and commentary**

A sound legal framework underpins a robust institutional and governance structure of the SWF and a clear delineation of responsibilities between the SWF and other governmental entities. This framework facilitates the formulation and implementation of appropriate objectives and investment policies, and is necessary for an SWF to operate effectively to achieve its stated purpose.

The legal framework of an SWF generally follows one of three approaches. The *first* type of SWFs is established as a separate legal identity with full capacity to act and governed by a specific constitutive law (e.g., Kuwait, Korea, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, ADIA)). Such SWFs are legal identities under public law. The *second* category of SWFs takes the form of a state-owned corporation (e.g., Singapore’s Temasek and Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC),<sup>12</sup> or China’s China Investment Corporation (CIC)). Although these corporations typically are governed by general company law, other SWF-specific laws may also apply. The *third* category of SWFs is constituted by a pool of assets without a separate legal identity. The pool of assets is owned by the state or the central bank (e.g., Botswana, Canada (Alberta), Chile, and Norway). In these cases, legislation typically sets out specific rules governing the asset pool. Provided that the overall legal framework is sound, each of these structures can be employed to meet the requirements laid down in this Principle.

***GAPP 1.1. Subprinciple. The legal framework for the SWF should ensure legal soundness of the SWF and its transactions.***

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<sup>12</sup>GIC is a corporation that is wholly owned by the government of Singapore and manages Singapore’s foreign reserves. The government is the owner of the reserves. However, Temasek—which also is wholly owned by the Government as its sole shareholder—is the legal owner of its assets.

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<sup>11</sup>See also GAPPs 6 and 16.

**Explanation and commentary**

This general principle has several implications. First, the establishment of the SWF should be clearly authorized under domestic law. Second, the legal structure should include a clear mandate for the manager to invest the SWF's assets and conduct all related transactions. Third, irrespective of the particular legal structure of an SWF, the beneficial and legal owners of the SWF's assets should be legally clear. Such clarity contributes to accountability in the home country, and is often required under the recipient countries' regulations.

**GAPP 1.2. Subprinciple.** The key features of the SWF's legal basis and structure, as well as the legal relationship between the SWF and other state bodies, should be publicly disclosed.

**Explanation and commentary**

Disclosure of the legal basis and structure of the SWF enhances the public understanding and confidence in the mandate to manage public monies. Clarity and disclosure of the legal relationship between the SWF and other state bodies (such as the central bank, development banks, other state-owned corporations and enterprises) contributes to a better understanding of the mandated responsibilities of the SWF vis-à-vis other government bodies, and of the SWF's institutional set-up and organization structures to ensure that it is managed professionally.

There are several ways in which the legal basis and structure of SWFs are disclosed. For SWFs that do not have a legal identity, their legal basis and structure is typically described in the provisions of publicly available legislation.<sup>13</sup> The legal structure of SWFs that

<sup>13</sup>For example, the SWF in Botswana was created by a provision in the Bank of Botswana Act; the Alberta Heritage Fund was established by the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Act; and the Norwegian Government Pension Fund was established by Government Pension Fund Law.

have a legal identity with capacity to act under public law is disclosed through the generally available constitutive laws of the SWF. Lastly, SWFs that are constituted as state-owned companies are normally governed by the country's company law (as well as other laws regulating private and public companies).<sup>14</sup> In addition, some SWFs disclose key features of their corporate structure on their websites (e.g., Australia, Canada (Alberta), Korea, Kuwait, New Zealand, and Singapore).

**Objectives and macroeconomic linkages****GAPP 2. Principle**

The policy purpose of the SWF should be clearly defined and publicly disclosed.

**Explanation and commentary**

A clearly defined policy purpose facilitates formulation of appropriate investment strategies based on economic and financial objectives (see also GAPP 19). The pursuit of any other types of objectives should be narrowly defined and mandated explicitly. A clearly defined policy purpose will also ensure that the operational management of the SWF will conduct itself professionally and ensure that the SWF undertakes investments without any intention or obligation to fulfill, directly or indirectly, any geopolitical agenda of the government. Public disclosure of the SWF's policy purpose provides a better understanding of what the SWF seeks to achieve and whether its behavior is consistent with the specified purpose.

SWFs are created by governments for a variety of policy purposes such as (i) stabilization funds (e.g., Russia, Chile, and Mexico), where the primary objective is to insulate the budget and the economy against commodity price swings; (ii) savings funds for future generations (e.g., Libya and Kuwait), which aim to convert non-renewable assets

<sup>14</sup>These laws could require disclosure of key information on the SWF's structure in a corporate registry that may be open to the public.

into a more diversified portfolio of assets to meet public sector superannuation liabilities in the future and mitigate the possible Dutch disease<sup>15</sup> effects of spending resource revenue; and (iii) reserve investment corporations (e.g., Korea, and Singapore’s GIC), whose assets or assets under management, to some extent, are still counted as reserve assets,<sup>16</sup> and are established to increase the return on reserves. These purposes or objectives may be multiple, overlapping, or changing over time.<sup>17</sup>

The SWF’s policy purpose guides its investment policy and asset management strategy. For instance, stabilization funds, which serve short- to medium-term objectives, usually have shorter investment horizons. By contrast, savings funds, which have longer-term objectives, typically aim at generating higher returns over a long time horizon. SWFs whose objective is to hedge against country-specific risks may hold assets with negative correlation to the country’s major exports to offset terms-of-trade shocks. Many SWFs only invest abroad, thus illustrating how the SWF’s purpose can affect its investment policy.

<sup>15</sup>Dutch disease refers to the situation where a boom in a commodity sector of the economy could lead to a loss of competitiveness for other sectors in this economy.

<sup>16</sup>Reserve assets consist of those external assets that are readily available to and controlled by monetary authorities for direct financing of payments imbalances, for indirectly regulating the magnitude of such imbalances through intervention in exchange markets to affect the currency exchange rate, and/or for other purposes (see IMF, *1993 Balance of Payments Manual*, page 97). Underlying the concept of reserve assets are the notions of “control,” and “availability for use,” by the monetary authorities.

<sup>17</sup>For example, in some countries (e.g., Botswana and Russia) stabilization funds have evolved into funds with a savings objective, as accumulated reserves increasingly have exceeded the amounts needed for short-term fiscal stabilization.

### **GAPP 3. Principle**

**Where the SWF’s activities have significant direct domestic macroeconomic implications, those activities should be closely coordinated with the domestic fiscal and monetary authorities, so as to ensure consistency with the overall macroeconomic policies.**

#### ***Explanation and commentary***

Since SWFs are often created for macroeconomic purposes, their operations should support and be consistent with a sound overall macroeconomic policy framework. The SWF’s operations can have a significant impact on public finances, monetary conditions, the balance of payments, and the overall sovereign balance sheet. Thus, operations of the SWF that have significant macroeconomic implications should be executed in coordination and consultation with the competent domestic authorities. For instance, transactions that involve an exchange between domestic and foreign currencies by an SWF may affect monetary conditions, the exchange rate, and domestic demand conditions.

### **Funding and withdrawal rules**

#### **GAPP 4. Principle**

**There should be clear and publicly disclosed policies, rules, procedures, or arrangements in relation to the SWF’s general approach to funding, withdrawal, and spending operations on behalf of the government.**

#### ***Explanation and commentary***

Policies, rules, procedures, or arrangements for the SWF’s funding, withdrawal, and spending operations on behalf of the government should be clearly set out and be consistent with the policy purpose of the SWF. This could be in the relevant legislation, charter, or other constitutive documents. Such a system helps provide a clear basis for deriving the expected time horizon and efficient investment policy for the savings,

and promotes macroeconomic stability and accountability. Funding and withdrawal rules are specific to the type of SWF. Fiscal stabilization funds are typically funded from revenue contingent deposit rules (e.g., exceeding a revenue or commodity price reference level), and their withdrawal rules are crafted to finance specific budget deficits or are set in motion by triggers such as a fall in a commodity price below a specified level.<sup>18</sup> Savings funds are typically funded by government budget surpluses, while the budget's expenditure path takes into account the long-term expected returns from the SWF.<sup>19</sup> Some SWFs keep their capital and returns, while others pay out targeted annual dividends.

***GAPP 4.1. Subprinciple. The source of SWF funding should be publicly disclosed.***

***Explanation and commentary***

Public disclosure of the source of an SWF's funding facilitates a better understanding of the uses of public monies, thereby promoting accountability. Many SWFs are funded out of mineral royalties (principally oil), while the remainder are funded from privatization receipts, general fiscal surpluses, and balance of payments surpluses and foreign exchange intervention. Returns on SWF investments also contribute to the buildup of assets under management. In a few cases, divestment proceeds and borrowing from markets have also played a role in asset accumulation. The extent to which the SWF's assets are also

<sup>18</sup>In Kuwait, a predetermined part of oil revenues is deposited in the SWF. In Chile, accumulation (and withdrawal) is based on a reference copper price determined annually by the authorities.

<sup>19</sup>For example, Norway's SWF receives the net central government receipts from petroleum activities and transfers to the budget the amounts needed to finance the non-oil deficit. Therefore, the net allocation to the SWF reflects the budget's overall balance.

classified as international reserves should be clarified.

***GAPP 4.2. Subprinciple. The general approach to withdrawals from the SWF and spending on behalf of the government should be publicly disclosed.***

***Explanation and commentary***

SWFs should aim at generating returns based on economic and financial considerations and, in general, engage directly in spending only for their own operating expenses. Instead of undertaking general government expenditure, withdrawals may be made from the SWF to the national budget, from which expenditure is made according to national priorities or specific earmarks (e.g., Singapore<sup>20</sup>). Making withdrawals within the budget framework will ensure consistency with macroeconomic policies, and the same applies to SWF spending on general government tasks.<sup>21</sup> The nation's budget documentation should also explain the contribution made by the SWF to the government's fiscal and monetary objectives.<sup>22</sup>

**Statistics compilation and reporting**

**GAPP 5. Principle**

**The relevant statistical data pertaining to the SWF should be reported on a timely basis to the owner, or as otherwise required, for inclusion where appropriate in macroeconomic data sets.**

<sup>20</sup>The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore provides that part of the investment income on Singapore's reserves can be used to support spending on the government budget.

<sup>21</sup>In Russia, withdrawals are approved by the federal budget laws.

<sup>22</sup>Some SWFs (e.g., in Libya) may be set up to directly finance domestic infrastructure investments or other public goods or services.

**Explanation and commentary**

Policymakers in general rely on macroeconomic data sets that are accurately compiled and disseminated by the national agencies (such as the national statistical office, and the statistics departments in the central bank and ministry of finance). The absence of economic data in national macroeconomic data sets of national accounts and fiscal, monetary, and external sector statistics can hinder economic analysis and potentially mislead data users. The importance of SWFs underlines the need for their activities to be captured in relevant macroeconomic data sets. Cooperation in data reporting primarily involves the owner, or—depending on national arrangement—the SWF, transmitting timely SWF data of good quality and relevant scope to the appropriate national agencies, using modalities of data transmission agreed with those national agencies. The data should be treated with customary confidentiality by the national agencies as set out in the statistical law/regulation(s). Adding a description of key features of the statistics supplied (“metadata”) facilitates their correct interpretation.

## **B. Institutional Framework and Governance Structure**

**Governance framework****GAPP 6. Principle**

**The governance framework for the SWF should be sound and establish a clear and effective division of roles and responsibilities in order to facilitate accountability and operational independence in the management of the SWF to pursue its objectives.<sup>23</sup>**

**Explanation and commentary**

Regardless of the specific governance framework, the SWF’s operational management should be conducted on an

<sup>23</sup>See also GAPPs 1, 10, 16, and 19.

independent basis to ensure its investment decisions and operations are based on economic and financial considerations consistent with its investment policy and objectives, in effect free of political influence or interference.

The governance structure should be set out in the SWF’s legal framework, for example, in the relevant legislation, charter or other constitutive documents. It should ensure appropriate and effective division of oversight, decision making, and operational responsibilities.<sup>24</sup> A number of SWFs, which are established as separate legal entities (e.g., Qatar, UAE (ADIA), Australia, and Singapore’s Temasek and GIC), have a governance structure that clearly differentiates an owner, a governing body,<sup>25</sup> and management of the SWF. Where SWFs are established as pools of assets without separate legal personality (e.g., Chile, Canada (Alberta), Mexico, Norway, Russia, Timor-Leste, and Trinidad and Tobago), the owner may exercise the functions of the governing body(ies) through one or more of its organizational units (e.g., a ministry, a parliamentary committee, etc.). In such cases it is important that there be a clear distinction between the owner/governing body(ies) and the agency responsible for the operational management of the SWF. For example, the operational management of the SWF could be delegated to an independent entity, such as the central bank (e.g., Chile, Norway, Timor-Leste, and Trinidad and Tobago) or a separate statutory agency (e.g., Canada (Alberta)).

**GAPP 7. Principle**

**The owner should set the objectives of the SWF, appoint the members of its governing body(ies) in accordance with clearly defined procedures, and exercise oversight over the SWF’s operations.**

<sup>24</sup>Relevant guidance includes the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.

<sup>25</sup>See GAPP 8 for a definition of the governing body.

**Explanation and commentary**

The owner<sup>26</sup> has two important roles. First, the owner determines the SWF's objectives. These include the broad policy purposes of the SWF and the investment mandate and acceptable levels of risk consistent with it. In some cases, the role of the owner is to determine objectives consistent with relevant statutory provisions; in other cases, these matters are determined by the owner without detailed legislative guidance or constraints. Second, the owner exercises its oversight responsibility in accordance with the legal structure of the SWF. For that purpose, there should be adequate reporting systems in place that give the owner a true picture of the SWF's performance, financial situation, and risk management practices in order to allow the owner to effectively oversee the SWF's performance (see also GAPP 23). In addition to these two roles, particularly in cases where the SWF is a separate legal entity, the owner generally appoints the members of the SWF's governing body(ies), the procedures and competency requirements for which should be well-structured and transparent.

**GAPP 8. Principle**

**The governing body(ies) should act in the best interests of the SWF, and have a clear mandate and adequate authority and competency to carry out its functions.**

**Explanation and commentary**

The governing body(ies) of the SWF sets the strategy and policies aimed at achieving the SWF's objectives and is ultimately responsible for the SWF's performance. In addition, its mandate may also include (i) deciding how to implement such strategies; (ii) delegating responsibilities and setting up committees as

deemed necessary;<sup>27</sup> and (iii) especially where the SWF is a separate legal entity, appointing and removing the SWF management (including the CEO and/or the managers). The governing body(ies) can take the form of a board of directors or trustees (e.g., Australia, China, Singapore's Temasek and GIC, UAE (ADIA), and Trinidad and Tobago), or a committee or commission (e.g., Ireland and Korea). In some cases, such as where the SWF is a pool of assets, the governing body(ies) may be, for example, (a unit in) the ministry of finance (e.g., Canada (Alberta), Norway, Mexico, Russia, and Timor-Leste) and/or be represented by the governing body(ies) of the central bank (e.g., Botswana).

The governing body(ies) should be structured so that it is able to exercise effective, independent, and objective judgment in respect of its responsibilities. It is important to establish a clear policy of a minimum standard of competency for governing body members—and members of the governing body committees, as the case may be—for them to perform their functions. A remuneration scheme that attracts and maintains qualified professionals fosters the established objectives of the SWF. As applicable, the governing body's roles and responsibilities, as well as the number of its members and their appointment, terms of office, and procedures for removal, should be clearly specified in the relevant legislation, charter, or other constitutive documents. Furthermore, the governing body's roles and responsibilities should be made publicly available.

**GAPP 9. Principle**

**The operational management of the SWF should implement the SWF's strategies in an independent manner and in accordance with clearly defined responsibilities.**

<sup>26</sup>The owner refers to the government as the beneficial and/or the legal owner of the SWF, or assets managed by the SWF, depending on the legal structure of the SWF (see GAPP 1).

<sup>27</sup>For example, these could include an Audit Committee and an Investment Committee.

**Explanation and commentary**

The management of the SWF responsible for its day-to-day operations should have the authority to make individual investment decisions, as well as to make operational decisions relating to staffing and financial management (subject to strategic direction from and accountability to the owner or the governing body(ies)). The operational management of the SWF should act in the best interest of the SWF, and its responsibilities should be clearly defined in the relevant legislation, charter, other constitutive documents, or management agreements.

To enhance confidence in recipient countries, it is important that managers' individual investment decisions to implement the SWF's defined strategy be protected from undue and direct political interference and influence. As owner, the role of the government is to determine the broad policy objectives of the SWF, but not to intervene in decisions relating to particular investments. A range of mechanisms could be employed to ensure the operational independence of the SWF's management:

- i. vesting responsibility for the SWF's management in a separate entity headed by a governing body with clearly defined responsibility for implementing the broad investment mandate established by the government;
- ii. providing extensive powers to the chief executive and senior managers where the SWF's governing body(ies) is not independent;
- iii. vesting responsibility for operational management in the hands of the central bank or statutory agency; or
- iv. contracting out responsibility for making individual investment decisions to external service providers on a fee-for-service basis.

One or more of the above mechanisms could be adopted, or the owner or the governing body(ies) should demonstrate that the

operational independence of the SWF's management is preserved.

**Accountability****GAPP 10. Principle**

**The accountability framework for the SWF's operations should be clearly defined in the relevant legislation, charter, other constitutive documents, or management agreement.**

**Explanation and commentary**

It is important that there are in place accountability arrangements for the owner, the governing body(ies), and the operational management, as applicable, which are commensurate with their respective defined responsibilities. The owner is accountable, for example, to the legislature (as is the case in Botswana, Canada (Alberta), Chile, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Timor-Leste, and Trinidad and Tobago) or the public, for the SWF's approved objectives. In cases of SWFs established as separate legal entities, the governing body(ies) is accountable to the owner, and management is accountable to the governing body(ies) for the SWF's operations, including its investment performance. In cases of SWFs without separate legal identity, the entity responsible for operational management is accountable to the owner.

Access to accurate, timely, and relevant information is essential to an effective accountability framework. In addition, developing appropriate evaluation methods could facilitate the monitoring by owners and governing body(ies), or both as the case may be, of the performance of SWF managers in achieving their objectives (see also GAPP 23).

**GAPP 11. Principle**

**An annual report and accompanying financial statements on the SWF's operations and performance should be prepared in a timely fashion and in accordance with recognized international or national accounting standards in a consistent manner.**

**Explanation and commentary**

The annual report and the financial statements should present the performance of the SWF's assets and liabilities and be based on a reliable and consistent accounting system. This is important to ensure that information about investments and performance is clear, fair, accurate, and comparable for accountability reasons. It is also important that the financial statements include information on contingent liabilities and off-balance sheet transactions, as applicable. In most cases, the financial statements are prepared according to international financial reporting standards (e.g., Azerbaijan, Botswana, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, and UAE (ADIA)) or equivalent national accounting standards (e.g., Australia, China, Korea, New Zealand, and Singapore).<sup>28</sup>

**GAPP 12. Principle**

**The SWF's operations and financial statements should be audited annually in accordance with recognized international or national auditing standards in a consistent manner.**

**Explanation and commentary**

The SWF's activities, finances, accounting and operational systems, and controls should be internally audited on a regular basis, as applicable. The audit procedures should be open for review. The internal audit process should be independent of the SWF's operational management and result in periodic internal audit reports, which could be presented to the owner or the governing body(ies) (or a committee thereof).

The SWF's financial statements should be subject to an annual independent external audit in line with international standards, or equivalent national auditing standards, so as to provide assurance that the financial statements fairly represent the financial position and performance of the SWF in all

material respects. Information on accounting policies and any qualification to the statements should be an integral part of the financial statements. The external audit report prepared by an independent commercial auditor should be submitted to the owner or the governing body(ies) (or a committee thereof). In some instances, an external audit report may also be prepared by an independent statutory auditor. The external auditor should be subject to strict qualification and suitability standards, and the selection process for commercial auditor should be transparent, independent, and free from political interference (for example, consistent with the International Federation of Accountants Code of Ethics).<sup>29</sup>

**Assurances of integrity of operations****GAPP 13. Principle**

**Professional and ethical standards should be clearly defined and made known to the members of the SWF's governing body(ies), management, and staff.**

**Explanation and commentary**

To ensure the soundness and integrity of the SWF's operations, members of the governing body(ies), managers, and staff should be appropriately qualified and well-trained, and should be subject to minimum professional standards. To the extent applicable, the governing body(ies) should require establishment of a code of conduct for all members of the governing body(ies), management, and staff, including compliance programs. Furthermore, members of the governing body(ies), managers, and staff should be subject to conflicts of interest guidelines, and rules. These codes, guidelines, and rules are critical in ensuring a high level of integrity and professionalism. In addition, adequate legal protection for members of the governing body(ies), management, and staff (such as customary provision of

<sup>28</sup>See [www.IFRS.com](http://www.IFRS.com).

<sup>29</sup>See IFAC, 2005, *Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants*.

indemnification and insurance where applicable) furthers the good-faith conduct of their official duties. In cases where the SWF is a pool of assets, professional and ethical standards should apply to staff employed by the entity(ies) involved in the operational management of the SWF.

**GAPP 14. Principle**  
**Dealing with third parties for the purpose of the SWF's operational management should be based on economic and financial grounds, and follow clear rules and procedures.**

***Explanation and commentary***

To ensure good governance and efficient use of resources, it is important that the SWF, its owners, or the entities in charge of the SWF's operational management establish clear rules and procedures for dealing with third parties (e.g., commercial fund managers and custodians, or external service providers).

**GAPP 15. Principle**  
**SWF operations and activities in host countries should be conducted in compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements of the countries in which they operate.**

***Explanation and commentary***

It is essential that the SWF respect host country rules and comply with all applicable laws and regulations of host countries in which SWF operations are conducted. Information with respect to the SWF's operations or activities within a given jurisdiction should be disclosed to the relevant regulators in such jurisdictions in compliance with applicable laws and regulations, including in connection with investigations or any other regulatory actions initiated by securities regulators or other relevant authorities. In particular, the SWF should (i) abide by any national securities laws, including disclosure requirements and market integrity rules addressing insider trading and market manipulation; (ii) provide disclosure to local

regulators, upon request and in confidence, of financial and non-financial information as required by applicable laws and regulation; (iii) where required by applicable law or regulation, be subject to local regulators, and cooperate with investigations and comply with regulatory actions initiated by local regulators or other relevant authorities; (iv) abide by any anti-monopoly rules; and (v) comply with all applicable tax rules. The SWF expects that host countries would not subject the SWF to any requirement, obligation, restriction, or regulatory action exceeding that to which other investors in similar circumstances may be subject.

**GAPP 16. Principle**  
**The governance framework and objectives, as well as the manner in which the SWF's management is operationally independent from the owner, should be publicly disclosed.**

***Explanation and commentary***

Public disclosure of the objectives and governance framework of the SWF promotes a clear understanding of what the SWF seeks to achieve and of the division of responsibilities to provide assurance that investment decisions are made on an independent basis without political interference. Such public disclosure would support the maintenance of an open and stable investment climate. In particular, it can assist in reassuring recipient countries that SWF investments are based on economic and financial considerations and employ sound operational controls and risk management systems.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>30</sup>For example, in Australia and Ireland, the SWFs disclose this information in annual reports, media releases, and on their websites. In Azerbaijan, the SWF responds to freedom of information requests and publishes information on its website, while SWFs in UAE (ADIA) and Singapore publish their objectives and governance structure on their websites.

**GAPP 17. Principle**

**Relevant financial information regarding the SWF should be publicly disclosed to demonstrate its economic and financial orientation, so as to contribute to stability in international financial markets and enhance trust in recipient countries.**

**Explanation and commentary**

The financial information referred to in this principle would normally be asset allocation, benchmarks where relevant, and rates of return over appropriate historical periods consistent with investment horizons.

Disclosure of these items will help to give guidance on risk appetite. These disclosures taken together with the disclosure of other items specified in the GAPP (particularly GAPPs 2, 4, 18.3, and 21) aim at meeting the intent of the GAPP to contribute to stability in international financial markets and enhance trust in recipient countries.

### **C. Investment and Risk Management Framework**

**Investment policy****GAPP 18. Principle**

**The SWF's investment policy should be clear and consistent with its defined objectives, risk tolerance, and investment strategy, as set by the owner or the governing body(ies), and be based on sound portfolio management principles.**

**Explanation and commentary**

The investment policy should set out how to achieve the SWF's defined objectives using the investment strategy as set by its owner or its governing body(ies). By defining the investment policy, the SWF commits to a disciplined investment plan. The investment policy also guides the SWF in implementing activities consistent with the approved investment objectives and strategies, and risk

tolerance,<sup>31</sup> as well as its investment monitoring procedures. Although there is no set formula that suits all situations, the investment policy, including the strategic asset allocation, should draw upon appropriate portfolio management principles.

The strategic asset allocation is typically embodied in a benchmark portfolio,<sup>32</sup> and determined by the SWF's policy purpose, liability profile, horizon over which expected returns and risk are defined, and characteristics of different asset classes.<sup>33</sup> The investment policy normally defines permissible asset classes and gives guidance on concentration risk with regard to individual holdings, liquidity, and geographical and sectoral concentration. In line with the policy purpose of the SWF, the strategic asset allocation may set certain investment parameters, for example, exclusively investing in foreign assets. In addition, the strategic asset allocation may consider the SWF's investments in conjunction with other assets or liabilities of the country, resulting in, for example, investing in assets negatively correlated with the country's natural resources.

As the parameters and assumptions underlying the SWF's investment policy—including its strategic asset allocation—change over time, a periodic review is needed (e.g., as

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<sup>31</sup>Risk tolerance refers to an investor's willingness and ability to handle declines in the value of his/her portfolio. For example, it can be expressed as the degree of uncertainty that an investor can accept with regard to a negative change in the value of the portfolio.

<sup>32</sup>A benchmark portfolio is a reference portfolio or an index constructed on the basis of the investment policy. It serves as a basis for comparison of the performance of the actual portfolio.

<sup>33</sup>Asset class refers to a group of securities that exhibit similar characteristics, and behave similarly in the financial market. Examples of asset classes include stocks, bonds, and real estate.

is currently done by SWFs in Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore).

***GAPP 18.1. Subprinciple.*** The investment policy should guide the SWF’s financial risk exposures and the possible use of leverage.

***Explanation and commentary***

Exposures to financial risks (including market, credit, and liquidity risks), the use of derivatives, and leverage<sup>34</sup> commensurate with the SWF’s investment horizon and risk-bearing capacity are key determinants of its ability to meet its investment objectives and contribute to financial market stability. Such exposures and the use of derivatives and leverage should be well understood, and measured and managed appropriately (see GAPP 22).

Derivatives are useful in SWFs’ operations—some may use them only for hedging purposes, whereas others also use them for active position taking. While SWFs typically do not use much leverage, this is often an integral part of an SWF’s investment, risk management, and cash management frameworks. It may show up in a variety of forms, including traditional borrowing to finance investments, use of futures and options contracts, interest rate and currency swaps, repos, and buy/sell-back operations. In addition, leverage is an integral part of investing in certain asset classes such as “alternative investments” and real estate (including from a rate of return and from a tax perspective, where appropriate).

***GAPP 18.2. Subprinciple.*** The investment policy should address the extent to which internal and/or external investment managers are used, the range of their activities and authority, and the process

**by which they are selected and their performance monitored.**

***Explanation and commentary***

In addition to internal managers, SWFs may allocate part of their assets to one or more external institutions for investment management. An SWF may use external managers because they may (i) have skills and established systems for undertaking investment activities in specialized instruments and markets for which the SWF does not have a capability; and (ii) assist SWFs in managing or reducing the costs of maintaining an asset management operation in a particular market or instrument. In these and similar circumstances, SWFs carefully select reputable and creditworthy investment managers and enter into written investment management agreements. Such agreements typically provide for (i) specification of an investment mandate; (ii) an agreed understanding of expected performance and investment risk—including tracking errors—reports, and fees; and (iii) where appropriate, a clear undertaking by the investment manager of any promised particular investment methodology or a team to whom historical performance may have been attributed.

***GAPP 18.3. Subprinciple.*** A description of the investment policy of the SWF should be publicly disclosed.

***Explanation and commentary***

The description could include qualitative statements on the investment style (e.g., active/passive, financial/strategic) or investment themes, the investment objectives, the investment horizon, and the strategic asset allocation. These disclosures, together with the disclosure of relevant financial information as described in GAPP 17, should give an indication of risk appetite and exposure. In addition, the SWF may describe the use of leverage in its portfolio or disclose other meaningful measures of financial risk exposure.

<sup>34</sup>Leverage is using borrowed funds or debt in such a way that the potential positive or negative outcome is magnified and/or enhanced.

**GAPP 19. Principle**

**The SWF's investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns in a manner consistent with its investment policy, and based on economic and financial grounds.**

**Explanation and commentary**

It is a core principle that SWFs' overarching objective is to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns, given the risk tolerance level of the owner. SWFs' investment decisions and activities, therefore, should be guided by and be consistent with this objective.

**GAPP 19.1. Subprinciple. If investment decisions are subject to other than economic and financial considerations, these should be clearly set out in the investment policy and be publicly disclosed.**

**Explanation and commentary**

Some SWFs may exclude certain investments for various reasons, including legally binding international sanctions and social, ethical, or religious reasons (e.g., Kuwait, New Zealand, and Norway). More broadly, some SWFs may address social, environmental, or other factors in their investment policy. If so, these reasons and factors should be publicly disclosed.

**GAPP 19.2. Subprinciple. The management of an SWF's assets should be consistent with what is generally accepted as sound asset management principles.**

**Explanation and commentary**

The SWF should manage its assets and discharge its other duties with care, skill, and diligence. The same applies to delegating authority and in selecting and supervising investment managers. Sound asset management also requires that each investment be considered in the context of the overall portfolio, and not in isolation only, and as part of an overall investment strategy that incorporates risk and return reasonably

suitable to the SWF's approved investment policy and objectives. Fees and costs incurred in performance of its investment activities should be reasonable in amount, and the process of authorization and incurrence, and amounts paid, should be transparent to its owner or its governing body(ies) and follow clear rules and procedures, and be subject to ethics rules (see GAPP 14).

**GAPP 20. Principle**

**The SWF should not seek or take advantage of privileged information or inappropriate influence by the broader government in competing with private entities.**

**Explanation and commentary**

This principle promotes the fair competition of SWFs with private entities. For example, SWFs should not seek advantages such as those arising from privileged access to market sensitive information.<sup>35</sup>

**GAPP 21. Principle**

**SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental element of their equity investments' value. If an SWF chooses to exercise its ownership rights, it should do so in a manner that is consistent with its investment policy and protects the financial value of its investments.<sup>36</sup> The SWF should publicly disclose its general approach to voting securities of listed entities, including the key factors guiding its exercise of ownership rights.**

**Explanation and commentary**

SWFs' demonstrated ability to contribute to the stability of global financial markets results in part from their ability to invest on a long-term, patient basis. The exercise of voting

<sup>35</sup>However, recipient countries may grant to SWFs certain privileges based on their governmental status, such as sovereign immunity and sovereign tax treatment.

<sup>36</sup>See GAPP 15.

rights is seen to be important by some SWFs for their capacity to hold assets and preserve value rather than becoming a forced seller and, by definition, a shorter-term investor. The exercise of ownership rights is also seen by some SWFs as a mechanism for keeping the management of a company accountable to the shareholders, and thus contributing to good corporate governance and a sound allocation of resources.

To dispel concerns about potential noneconomic or nonfinancial objectives, SWFs should disclose *ex ante* whether and how they exercise their voting rights. This could include, for example, a public statement that their voting is guided by the objective to protect the financial interests of the SWF. In addition, SWFs should disclose their general approach to board representation. When SWFs have board representation, their directors will perform the applicable fiduciary duties of directors, including representation of the collective interest of all shareholders.

To demonstrate that their voting decisions continue to be based on economic and financial criteria, SWFs could also make appropriate *ex post* disclosures.

### **Risk management and performance measurement**

#### **GAPP 22. Principle**

**The SWF should have a framework that identifies, assesses, and manages the risks of its operations.**

#### **Explanation and commentary**

It is important for the SWF to have a strong risk management<sup>37</sup> culture, where senior management is engaged in crafting and enforcing risk management processes, and a

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<sup>37</sup>Risk management is the process of identifying the desired level of risk, measuring the current level of risk, monitoring the new actual level of risk, and taking actions that bring the actual level of risk to be aligned with the desired level of risk.

well-functioning risk management framework to ensure that it is able to identify, assess, and manage its risks to protect its assets and stay within the tolerance levels as set in the investment policy. Adherence to high standards in risk management with sound operational controls and systems will also help achieve the aim of preserving international financial stability as well as maintaining a stable, transparent, and open investment environment.

The risks that SWFs face in their investment operations can be classified into four broad categories: financial, operational, regulatory, and reputational risks. The main financial risks are market risk (e.g., interest rate, foreign currency, equity and commodity price risks), credit risk (e.g., issuer, counterparty, and settlement risks), and liquidity risk. The main operational risks<sup>38</sup> include people risk (incompetence and fraud), business continuity risk, process risk, technology risk, and legal risk. The main regulatory risk stems from changes in the laws and regulations governing the operation of SWFs in countries of origin as well as recipient countries, or from changes in the application of such laws and regulations. Reputational risk is the potential that negative publicity regarding an SWF's business practices, whether true or untrue, may cause a decline in investment returns, costly litigation, or loss of counterparties, or impair the home country government's international standing.

***GAPP 22.1. Subprinciple.* The risk management framework should include reliable information and timely reporting systems, which should enable the adequate monitoring and management of relevant risks within acceptable parameters and levels, control and incentive mechanisms, codes of conduct,**

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<sup>38</sup>Operational risks are the risk of loss from failures in a company's systems and procedures or events completely outside of the control of the organization.

**business continuity planning, and an independent audit function.**

***Explanation and commentary***

The measurement and management of financial risks is typically done by using quantitative methodologies and models. To complement these models and to mitigate “model risk,” stress tests<sup>39</sup> should regularly be conducted to evaluate the potential effects of macroeconomic and financial variables or shocks.

To assess, manage, or mitigate operational risks, there should be an established and documented framework that has clear lines of responsibility, segregation of duties,<sup>40</sup> and reliable control mechanisms. Codes of conduct and recruitment policies are important to ensure the professional and ethical behavior of staff involved in the SWF’s operations. To ensure that the SWF can continue operating in case of a technology breakdown or natural disaster, contingency planning, including alternative sites of operation, is an important part of the framework.

In mitigating regulatory and reputational risks, it is important to have systems to track current regulatory and legal requirements in each recipient country that the SWF invests in. Impact assessment of any forthcoming changes in the regulatory environment should be conducted regularly. To satisfy the owner and the governing body(ies) that risks in the SWF are managed properly, the risk management framework should be subject to a regular independent audit.

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<sup>39</sup>A stress test is a simulation technique used on investment portfolios to determine the financial outcome in different scenarios.

<sup>40</sup>The lines of responsibilities and segregation of duties should be clear both at the operational level (e.g., among the front, middle, and back offices) and at the senior management committee level (e.g., between the Investment Committee and the Risk Management Committee).

***GAPP 22.2. Subprinciple.*** The general approach to the SWF’s risk management framework should be publicly disclosed.

***Explanation and commentary***

Public disclosure of the SWF’s general approach to its risk management policies and key actions related to governance and the soundness of its operations reassures that the SWF, its governing body(ies), or management adheres to a high standard of managing operational, regulatory, and reputational risks. However, there are certain elements of the risk management framework (such as information about the alternative sites of operation) that are considered to be sensitive information and should not be disclosed. Adherence to high standards, including transparent operational control and risk management systems, together with a constructive engagement by recipient countries, will help achieve the aim of maintaining a stable, transparent, and open investment environment.

***GAPP 23. Principle***

**The assets and investment performance (absolute and relative to benchmarks, if any) of the SWF should be measured and reported to the owner according to clearly defined principles or standards.**

***Explanation and commentary***

Accurate and consistent measurement and reporting of investments and investment performance enables the managers of an SWF to make well-informed judgments about their investments. Reliable performance measurement is also important for back-testing of risk measurement models. For the owners and the governing body(ies), this is crucial for assessing how well managers are keeping to their defined objectives. Users of statistics based on the valuation of assets also need to be assured of the sound measurement of the underlying data.

Investment benchmarks are an important tool for assessing performance and monitoring the

accountability of SWFs. If benchmarks are used, performance assessment and accountability will, *inter alia*, occur through the comparison of performance of the actual portfolio relative to the benchmark portfolio.

### **GAPP implementation**

#### **GAPP 24. Principle**

**A process of regular review of the implementation of the GAPP should be engaged in by or on behalf of the SWF.**

#### ***Explanation and commentary***

It is desirable for each SWF or its owner or governing body(ies) on behalf of the SWF to

use the GAPP to review the SWF's existing arrangements and assess its ongoing implementation on a regular basis, with the results reported to its owner or governing body(ies). The implementation can be verified through self-assessment performed by the SWF along with its owner, or other mechanisms such as third-party verification as determined by the SWF or its owner or governing body(ies). The owner or the governing body(ies) may choose to publicly disclose the assessment to the extent it believes such disclosure is consistent with applicable laws and/or regulations and may contribute to stability in international financial markets and enhance trust in recipient countries.



# Appendices and References

## Appendix I. Defining Sovereign Wealth Funds

1. SWFs are defined as follows:
2. *SWFs are defined as special purpose investment funds or arrangements, owned by the general government. Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies which include investing in foreign financial assets. The SWFs are commonly established out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports.*
3. This definition excludes, *inter alia*, foreign currency reserve assets held by monetary authorities for the traditional balance of payments or monetary policy purposes, operations of state-owned enterprises in the traditional sense, government-employee pension funds, or assets managed for the benefit of individuals.
4. *Three key elements* define an SWF:
  - Ownership: SWFs are *owned* by the *general government*, which includes both central government and subnational governments.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>41</sup>Note that the use of the word *arrangements* as an alternative to *funds* allows for a flexible interpretation of the legal arrangement through which the assets can be invested. SWFs vary in their institutional arrangements, and the way they are recorded in the macroeconomic accounts may differ depending on their individual circumstances. See also the IMF's *Government Finance Statistics Manual*, 2001.

- Investments: The investment strategies include investments in *foreign financial assets*, so it excludes those funds that solely invest in domestic assets.
- Purposes and Objectives: Established by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs are created to invest government funds to achieve *financial objectives*, and (may) have liabilities that are only broadly defined, thus allowing SWFs to employ a wide range of investment strategies with a medium- to long-term timescale. SWFs are created to serve a different objective than, for example, reserve portfolios held *only* for traditional balance of payments purposes. While SWFs may include reserve assets, the intention is not to regard all reserve assets as SWFs.<sup>42</sup>

Furthermore, the reference in the definition that SWFs are “commonly established out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports” reflects both the traditional background to the creation of SWFs—the revenues received from mineral wealth—and the more recent approach of transferring “excess reserves.”

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<sup>42</sup>Likewise, the intention is not to exclude all assets on the books of central banks: SWFs can be on the books of central banks if they also are held for purposes other than balance of payments purposes (e.g., as intergenerational wealth transfer).

## Appendix II. List of IWG Members and Recipient Countries That Participated in the IWG Meetings

### A. List of IWG Countries, SWFs, and Institutions

#### Countries and Their SWFs

Australia: Australian Future Fund  
 Azerbaijan: State Oil Fund  
 Bahrain: Reserve Fund for Strategic Projects  
 Botswana: Pula Fund  
 Canada: Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund  
 Chile: Economic and Social Stabilization Fund / Pension Reserve Fund  
 China: China Investment Corporation  
 Equatorial Guinea: Fund for Future Generations  
 Islamic Republic of Iran: Oil Stabilization Fund  
 Ireland: National Pensions Reserve Fund  
 Korea: Korea Investment Corporation  
 Kuwait: Kuwait Investment Authority  
 Libya: Libyan Investment Authority  
 Mexico: Oil Stabilization Fund  
 New Zealand: Superannuation Fund  
 Norway: Government Pension Fund  
 Qatar: Qatar Investment Authority  
 Russia: Reserve Fund / National Wealth Fund  
 Singapore: Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd / Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Pte Ltd  
 Timor-Leste: Petroleum Fund of Timor-Leste  
 Trinidad and Tobago: Heritage and Stabilization Fund  
 United Arab Emirates: Abu Dhabi Investment Authority  
 United States: Alaska Permanent Fund

#### Permanent Observers to the IWG

Oman: State General Reserve Fund  
 Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency  
 Vietnam: State Capital Investment Corporation  
 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
 World Bank

#### IWG Secretariat

International Monetary Fund

### B. Representatives from the IWG Countries, SWFs, and Institutions

#### Co-Chairs

Hamad Al Hurr Al Suwaidi  
 Abu Dhabi Finance Department  
 Jaime Caruana  
 International Monetary Fund

#### Member Countries

##### AUSTRALIA

Ian Beckett  
 The Treasury  
 Felicity McNeill  
 Department of Finance and Deregulation  
 David Murray (Chair, IWG Drafting Group)  
 Australian Future Fund

##### AZERBAIJAN

Ruslan Alakbarov  
 State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan  
 Azer Mursagulov  
 Ministry of Finance

##### KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN

Mohamed Mubarak Al Sulaity  
 Ministry of Finance  
 Yousif Abdulla Humood  
 Ministry of Finance  
 Talal M. Kazim  
 Ministry of Finance

##### BOTSWANA

Linah K. Mohohlo  
 Bank of Botswana  
 Oduetse A. Motshidisi  
 Bank of Botswana

##### CANADA

Arvind Bhatia  
 Department of Finance  
 Wayne Foster  
 Department of Finance  
 Rod Matheson  
 Alberta Finance and Enterprise

##### CHILE

Amelia Huerta Bertrand  
 Ministry of Finance  
 Eric Parrado  
 Ministry of Finance

Juan Carlos Piantini  
Central Bank of Chile  
Patricio Sepulveda  
Ministry of Finance

## CHINA

Wang Jianxi  
China Investment Corporation  
Wang Shuilin  
China Investment Corporation  
Zhang Hong  
China Investment Corporation  
Wu Xueling  
China Investment Corporation  
Liu Haoling  
China Investment Corporation

## ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

Abdelali Jbili  
International Monetary Fund  
Jafar Mojarrad  
International Monetary Fund

## IRELAND

Eileen Fitzpatrick  
National Treasury Management Agency  
Dermot Keane  
Department of Finance

## KOREA

Yi Tae Kim  
Ministry of Strategy and Finance  
Byunghoon Nam  
Ministry of Strategy and Finance  
Jeyoon Shin  
Ministry of Strategy and Finance  
Ik Ho Suh  
Korea Investment Corporation

## KUWAIT

Bader Mohammad Al-Sa'ad  
Kuwait Investment Authority  
Mahmoud Ahmed Mahmoud  
Kuwait Investment Authority  
Nadeya Mohamed  
World Bank

## LIBYA

Mohamed H. Layas  
Libyan Investment Authority

## MEXICO

José Gabriel Cuadra García  
Banco de México  
Alfonso Guerra  
International Monetary Fund  
Gerardo Rodríguez  
Ministry of Finance  
Marco Oviedo  
Ministry of Finance

## NEW ZEALAND

Yuong Ha  
International Monetary Fund  
Brian McCulloch  
New Zealand Treasury  
Adrian Orr  
New Zealand Superannuation Fund

## NORWAY

Thomas Ekeli  
Ministry of Finance  
Ola Peter Krohn Gjessing  
Norges Bank Investment Management  
Martin Skancke  
Ministry of Finance

## QATAR

Ahmed M. Al-Sayed  
Qatar Investment Authority  
Tariq M. Muslih  
Qatar Investment Authority  
Kenneth Shen  
Qatar Investment Authority

## RUSSIA

Peter Kazakevitch  
Ministry of Finance  
Roman Shiyko  
Ministry of Finance  
Yulia Snizhkova  
Bank of Russia

## SINGAPORE

Vivien Chen  
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation  
Hasan Jafri  
Temasek Holdings  
Laurence Lien  
Ministry of Finance

## INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS

Siong Guan Lim  
Government of Singapore Investment  
Corporation  
Ashok Srinivasan  
Temasek Holdings

### TIMOR-LESTE

Abraão F. De Vasconcelos  
Banking and Payments Authority  
Emilia Pires  
Ministry of Finance

### TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Allison Lewis  
Ministry of Finance  
Ewart S. Williams  
Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago

### UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

William J. Brown  
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority  
Euart Glendinning  
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority  
Saeed R. Al-Hajeri  
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority  
Robert E.B. Peake  
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority

### UNITED STATES

Michael J. Burns  
Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation  
Robert Kaproth  
U.S. Department of the Treasury

### Permanent Observers

#### OMAN

Ghalib Al Busaidy  
State General Reserve Fund  
Rashid Al Khaifi  
Ministry of Finance

#### SAUDI ARABIA

Muhammad Al-Jasser  
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency  
Khaled Akhattaf  
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency  
Ahmed Al-Kholifey  
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency  
Ahmed A. Al Nassar  
International Monetary Fund  
Saad M. Al Nefae  
International Monetary Fund

### OECD

Kathryn Gordon  
Pierre Poret

### WORLD BANK

Alex Berg  
Jennifer Johnson-Calari  
Sudhir Rajkumar  
Isabelle Strauss-Kahn

### International Monetary Fund (IWG Secretariat)

Wouter Bossu  
Norma Cayo  
Udaibir S. Das (Head of IWG Secretariat)  
Antonio Galicia-Escotto  
Robert Heath  
David J. V. Hofman  
Francine Koch  
Peter Kunzel  
Thomas Laryea  
Ross Leckow  
Laura Lipscomb  
Yan Liu  
Yinqiu Lu  
Adnan Mazarei  
Christian B. Mulder  
William Murray  
Michael Papaioannou  
Iva Petrova  
Jukka Pihlman  
Jon Shields  
Alison Stuart  
Amadou Nicolas Racine Sy  
Mauricio Villafuerte

### C. Recipient Country Representatives Who Participated in the IWG Meetings

#### EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Marco Buti  
Moreno Bertoldi  
Klaus Regling  
Francisco Caballero-Sanz

#### AUSTRALIA

Christopher Legg  
Australian Treasury

#### BRAZIL

Cleber Ubiratan de Oliveira  
National Treasury

Guilherme Binato Villela Pedras  
National Treasury  
Fabiano Maia Pereira  
National Treasury

## CANADA

Richard Saillant  
Industry Canada

## FRANCE

Benoît Claveranne  
International Monetary Fund  
Jean-Marie Demange  
Embassy of France in Singapore  
Laurence Dubois-Destrizais  
Ministry of Economy, Industry and  
Employment  
Patrick Herve  
French Embassy in Chile  
Pierre-François Weber  
International Monetary Fund

## GERMANY

Steffen Meyer  
Federal Ministry of Finance  
Klaus Stein  
International Monetary Fund

## INDIA

Saranyan Krishnan  
International Monetary Fund  
Partha Ray  
International Monetary Fund

## ITALY

Gian Paolo Ruggiero  
Italian Treasury Department  
Francesco Spadafora  
International Monetary Fund

## JAPAN

Koichi Kimura  
Embassy of Japan in Singapore  
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International Monetary Fund  
Teruhiro Ozaki  
Ministry of Finance

## SPAIN

Ramon Guzman  
International Monetary Fund

## SOUTH AFRICA

Goolam Aboobaker  
International Monetary Fund

## UNITED KINGDOM

Alex Gibbs  
International Monetary Fund  
Nicholas Joicey  
H.M. Treasury  
Paul Madden  
High Commission in Singapore

## UNITED STATES

Clay Lowery  
U.S. Treasury Department

### Appendix III. Background Information on IWG Member Countries' SWFs

(The listing is alphabetically ordered according to country names. The information contained relates to the position as of end-July 2008.)

#### Australia: The Future Fund

##### Goals and objectives

The Future Fund Act 2006 (the Act) commenced on April 3, 2006, and established the Future Fund Special Account (the Fund Account), the Future Fund Board of Guardians (the Board) and the Future Fund Management Agency (the Agency), collectively referred to as the Future Fund. The object of the Act is to strengthen the Commonwealth's long-term financial position.

The Future Fund will make provision for unfunded superannuation liabilities that will become payable during a period when an aging population is likely to place significant pressure on the Commonwealth's finances. The legislation quarantines the Fund, the balance of the Fund Account and other investments, for the ultimate purpose of paying unfunded superannuation liabilities and expenses associated with the investment and administration of both the Board of Guardians, and by direct transfer from the administered funds, the expenses of the Future Fund Management Agency.

**How the fund is managed**

The Future Fund is controlled by an independent Board of Guardians that is collectively responsible for the investment decisions of the fund and is accountable to the Australian Government for the safekeeping and performance of fund assets. The Future Fund Management Agency is responsible for the development of recommendations to the Board on appropriate investment strategies and for the implementation of these strategies. The functions of both the Board of Guardians and the Future Fund Management Agency are set out in the Future Fund Act. The Board of Guardians reports annually to the Australian Parliament on all aspects of the Fund's performance, and the Fund is subject to independent external audit by the Australian National Audit Office. At June 30, 2008, the assets of the Future Fund portfolio were valued at A\$64.18 billion.

In the 2008–09 budget, the Australian Government announced that the Future Fund Board of Guardians and Management Agency would be given additional responsibility for managing the investment of three additional specific purpose funds that the government proposes to establish to support expenditure on education, health, and infrastructure.

**Azerbaijan: The State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan**

The State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) was established in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan No. 240 dated December 29, 1999.

**Goals and objectives**

SOFAZ is an organization whereby oil- and natural gas-related windfalls of Azerbaijan are accumulated and efficiently managed for the benefit of the country and its present and future generations.

**How the fund is managed**

SOFAZ has a three-tier management structure, with the President of the Republic

of Azerbaijan being a supreme governing and reporting authority for the Fund. Activities of the Fund in the field of managing and spending assets of the Fund are overseen by a Supervisory Board, composed of representatives of various government authorities, two Members of Parliament nominated by the Speaker of Parliament and community-based institutions.

Administrative and operational management of the Fund is vested with the Executive Director, appointed by and accountable to the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The Fund publishes quarterly reports on its financial position in major newspapers of the country. These reports, as well as annual reports together with audited financial statements and the report of independent auditors (Deloitte), are available at the SOFAZ's website ([www.oilfund.az/en](http://www.oilfund.az/en)). In addition to reports to the president of the country and the Supervisory Board, the Fund regularly reports to the Parliamentary Chamber of Accounts (the supreme audit institution of the country), Ministries of Finance and Economic Development, and the State Committee for Statistics.

**Relations between fund and budget**

The Fund may finance only projects that are included in the Public Investment Programme, which is to be submitted to the Parliament together with the annual consolidated budget. SOFAZ's primary expenditure items are directed to the financing of projects aimed at the socio-economic development of the country, as well as the important infrastructure projects.

**Bahrain: The Future Generations Reserve Fund**

The Future Generations Reserve Fund (FGF) of Bahrain was established with a Royal Decree issued on July 17, 2006.

**Source and purpose of the FGF**

The FGF's purpose is to strengthen Bahrain's long-term fiscal management and help preserve the hydrocarbon wealth. The FGF

receives, in monthly payments, part of the oil income accruing from higher than budgeted oil prices.

#### ***Institutional framework***

The FGF is owned by the Government of Bahrain and managed by the Ministry of Finance. Its governance framework includes a Board of Directors and a head of the Investment, Operations, and Administrative team.

#### ***Accounting and reporting***

The FGF's activities are audited internally by an Audit Directorate, and its financial statements are subject to an external audit by an independent commercial auditor.

#### ***Investment and risk management***

The FGF invests only in liquid instruments with the aim of preserving its capital. The risk management framework encompasses a range of financial risks, including interest rate, liquidity, currency, and credits risks.

As a newly established SWF, the FGF's policies and procedures of operation are still in the process of development.

### **Botswana: The Pula Fund**

The Pula Fund was established in 1993 under the Bank of Botswana Act (CAP 55:01).

#### ***Source of funds***

The Pula Fund is a long-term fund and forms part of the overall foreign exchange reserves. The accumulation of foreign exchange reserves stems from the general trend of surpluses in the balance of payments, which were based mainly on the export of diamonds.

#### ***Ownership of the Pula Fund***

The Pula Fund is accounted for in the balance sheet of Bank of Botswana. Through budget surpluses, the Government has accumulated cash balances with the Bank of Botswana. The balances with the Bank of Botswana are transformed into direct government ownership of part of the Pula Fund.

Currently, the Government's share of the Pula Fund is about two-thirds, while the remainder is owned by the Bank.

#### ***Investment policy and asset allocation***

The Pula Fund, being a part of the foreign exchange reserves, is exclusively invested in foreign currency denominated assets. The investment objectives are based on the maintenance of the purchasing power of the reserves and maximizing returns within acceptable risk parameters. The strategic asset allocation includes public equity and fixed income instruments in industrialized economies.

#### ***Assets under management***

At the end of 2007 the Pula Fund amounted to US\$6.6 billion, equivalent to 56 percent of GDP and 18 months of import cover. The Pula Fund accounted for 68 percent of the total foreign exchange reserves.

#### ***Reporting of Pula Fund activities***

The financial and investment activities of the Pula Fund are reported in the financial statements of the Bank. Annual financial statements are audited by external auditors and submitted to the Minister of Finance and Development Planning, for submission to Parliament.

### **Canada (Alberta): The Heritage Savings Trust Fund**

The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund (Heritage Fund) was created in 1976 with the passage of the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Act.

#### ***Goals and objectives***

The Heritage Fund was established as a means of saving a portion of the royalty and other revenues that the Province of Alberta receives from the production of its oil and natural gas resources. Initially the Fund received annual transfers of non-renewable resource revenues from the Province and retained its investment income. Since 1982 the investment income from the Fund has been transferred to the

Province's General Revenue Fund and is used to help pay for government programs and services. Automatic annual transfers of revenues into the Fund stopped in 1987. Since that time the Fund has grown through regular inflation-proofing and capital additions made by the government from time to time, primarily from budgetary surpluses.

Assets and income of the Heritage Fund are fully consolidated with the assets and revenue of the Province. As of March 31, 2008, the assets in the fund are approximately Can\$17 billion.

On January 1, 1997, a new *Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Act* was passed. This Act sets out the current structure and investment framework for the Fund. The Fund is managed as an endowment fund with the goal to maximize long-term returns at a prudent level of risk. The Fund is not to be used for economic development or social investment purposes.

#### **Investment policy**

Under the legislation, the provincial Minister of Finance is assigned responsibility for the Fund and its investments. The Minister is required to adhere to investment policies that a reasonable and prudent person would apply in respect of a portfolio of investments to avoid undue risk of loss and obtain a reasonable return. The Minister must report on the performance of the Fund quarterly within 60 days of the end of the quarter and make public the Annual Report within 90 days of the end of the fiscal year. A three-year business plan is prepared and published annually as part of the provincial budget.

The Fund consists of investments in bonds, public and private equities, hedge funds, derivatives, real estate, and other real asset investments such as infrastructure and timberlands. The current allocations are approximately 32 percent to cash and fixed income, 46 percent to Canadian and global equity, 11 percent to real estate, and 11 percent to alternative investments. The assets of the Heritage Fund are globally diversified.

#### **Governance arrangement**

The Minister must report on the performance of the Fund quarterly within 60 days of the end of the quarter and make public the Annual Report within 90 days of the end of the fiscal year. A three-year Business Plan is prepared and published annually as part of the provincial budget.

The legislation also creates the Standing Committee on the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund, which is a committee of the Alberta Legislature with members from all major parties of the legislature. The Standing Committee reviews and approves the Business Plan and Annual Report of the Fund, receives regular reports on the performance of the Fund, and conducts public meetings on an annual basis in different locations in the Province. The purpose of these meetings is to update Albertans on the investment activities and results of the Fund. The Auditor General of Alberta is the auditor of the Heritage Fund.

The Fund's investments are managed by the Alberta Investment Management Corporation (AIMCo). AIMCo is wholly owned by the Province and was established by statute in 2008 to manage all the government's investments including the Heritage Fund. AIMCo is governed by a Board of Directors and is operationally independent from the government.

#### **Chile: Fiscal Responsibility Funds**

##### **Goals and objectives**

The purpose of the fiscal policy is to contribute to macroeconomic stability and provide public assets increasing opportunities and social protection to Chileans. As of 2001, the fiscal policy has been guided by the structural rule. The structural balance concept reflects the trend in the financial situation of the central government. Thus, the effects of cyclical fluctuations in economic activity, the copper price, and other factors of a similar nature are excluded. In this way, public spending is dissociated from the cyclical evolution of the structural revenue track

record. This helps to avoid drastic adjustments in public spending in face of adverse economic effects in boom times, when the Government receives substantial transitory revenues.

In line with the implementation of a fiscal policy ensuring sustainability of public spending over time, a Fiscal Responsibility Law was enacted in September 2006. This law created the Pension Reserve Fund (PRF) and the Economic and Social Stability Fund (ESSF). As regards the PRF, the purpose is to supplement the financing of future pension contingencies. On the other hand, the main objectives of the ESSF are to finance potential fiscal deficits and amortize the public debt.

The Fiscal Responsibility Law establishes rules for the creation and accumulation of the Funds and raises the possibility of capitalizing the Central Bank of Chile (CBC). In accordance with the law, the PRF increases each year by a minimum amount equivalent to 0.2 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the previous year. If the actual fiscal surplus exceeds 0.2 percent of GDP, the PRF receives a contribution up to a maximum of 0.5 percent of GDP. The law provides that the Government will be able to make capital contributions to the CBC in an annual amount equivalent to the balance resulting from subtracting the contribution to the PRF from the actual surplus. However, the annual contribution may not exceed 0.5 percent of GDP of the previous year. Lastly, the ESSF will get the remaining balance resulting from subtracting from the actual surplus the contributions to the PRF and to the CBC.

#### ***Institutional arrangement***

The institutional arrangement of the two Funds is clearly defined in the law and additional regulations. To carry out the investment policy for the Funds, the Ministry of Finance appointed the CBC as the government agent to act on behalf and in the name of the Government to manage and invest the Funds' resources. The CBC must follow specific guidelines issued by the Ministry of Finance. These

guidelines establish the requirements and conditions to be applied for the correct and complete execution of the functions assigned to the CBC in its capacity of government agent.

The Fiscal Responsibility Law established that the Minister of Finance must be assisted by a Financial Committee to decide on the financial investment of the Funds' resources and define the necessary guidelines for implementation thereof. In compliance with this provision, on December 23, 2006, the Minister of Finance announced the creation of the Funds and the setting up of a private advisory committee, composed of professionals with extensive experience in economic and financial fields.

#### ***Investment policy***

The Funds' initial investment policy includes the same asset classes as the investment portfolio of the international reserves managed by the CBC. As of March 2007, investments include only short-term and low-risk financial instruments. In fact, 30 percent of the portfolio is invested in monetary market instruments, 66.5 percent in sovereign bonds, and 3.5 percent in inflation-indexed sovereign bonds.

At the end of 2008, the investment policy will include additional asset classes. The Financial Committee recommended that the Funds' new structure will include 15 percent in equities, 20 percent in corporate fixed-income, 45 percent in sovereign bonds, 15 percent in inflation-indexed bonds, and 5 percent in liquid assets. In this context, the recommendations presented by the Committee—and accepted by the Ministry of Finance—seek to maximize the Funds' return subject to an acceptable risk level. This new investment structure implies a greater investment diversification than the present one, and is more in line with the Funds' objectives.

As of June 2008, the ESSF and PRF reached US\$18.8 billion and US\$2.5 billion, respectively.

**China: China Investment Corporation*****Incorporation and purpose***

China Investment Corporation (CIC) was established on September 29, 2007, by the Chinese government in compliance with the Company Law of the People's Republic of China. It is wholly owned by the Chinese government and has its own corporate entity status. The purpose of the CIC is to maximize return at acceptable risk tolerance and improve the corporate governance of key state-owned financial institutions.

***Source of funds***

CIC's capital is funded through issuing special treasury bonds. With the approval of the Standing Committee of the 10th National People's Congress, the Ministry of Finance issued Y1.55 trillion special treasury bonds and used raised funds to purchase foreign reserves (US\$200 billion) to be injected into CIC as its registered equity capital. CIC has to pay dividends to the State Council as its owner, to cover the cost of these special treasury bonds.

***Governance arrangements***

As required by the Company Law, CIC has been working on its internal institutional setting and governance structure. It has established a Board of Directors, Supervisory Board, and management team. The appointment and dismissal of Board directors should be approved by the State Council. The chairman and vice chairman of the Board are appointed by the State Council. CIC's development strategies and operational and investment guidelines are determined by the Board of Directors. Responsibilities and accountabilities within the CIC, across departments and desks, are clearly defined.

***Reporting and auditing***

CIC's implementing performance and accounting are reported to the Board, and are subject to the scrutiny by the Supervisory Board. The Internal Audit Department carries out independent audits. The audit reports

shall be approved by the Chairman of the Supervisory Board. CIC is subject to financial supervision by the Ministry of Finance and periodic external auditing by the National Audit Office.

***Investment objectives and risk management***

CIC's investment objectives are first, to invest in a diversified portfolio of overseas financial instruments, to maximize long-term returns on CIC's capital; and second, to recapitalize domestic financial institutions as a shareholder abiding by relevant laws in order to maintain and increase the value of state-owned financial assets in its wholly owned subsidiary—Central Huijin.

CIC focuses its overseas investment mainly on equity, fixed-income, and alternative assets. CIC will allocate assets prudently and effectively at acceptable risk tolerance.

CIC has established its preliminary system of investment decision-making, internal control, and risk monitoring and management. CIC has established a risk management structure in order to ensure legitimate, compliant, sound, and prudent operation.

**Ireland: The National Pensions Reserve Fund**

The National Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF) was established on April 2, 2001, under the National Pensions Reserve Fund Act 2000. The purpose of the Fund is to meet as much as possible of the cost to the state of social welfare and public service pensions to be paid from 2025 until at least 2055. The Act provided for the establishment of the NPRF Commission to control the investment of the Fund, the appointment of the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) as Manager and annual contributions of 1 percent of GNP to the Fund. The latest projections are for public pensions expenditure (social welfare and public service) to increase from around 5 percent of GDP in 2007 to some 7.6 percent in 2025 and 13 percent by mid-century.

**NPRF Commission**

Under the NPRF Act, the NPRF Commission controls and manages the NPRF. There are seven members, appointed by the Minister on the basis that “they have acquired substantial expertise and experience at senior level” in a range of areas prescribed in the Act. The Commission has discretionary authority to determine the Fund’s investment strategy, within a statutory investment mandate of maximizing the investment return subject to an acceptable level of risk. This framework gives the Commission the freedom to develop, outside of the political process, a long-term investment strategy primarily based on a diversified portfolio of real assets. The Commission publishes a statutory annual report including its portfolio of investments. It also publishes quarterly performance statements on a non-statutory basis. The Fund accounts are audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General (Public Auditor) and are laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas (Parliament). The Chairperson of the Commission and the Chief Executive of the Manager can be called upon to give evidence to the Committee of Public Accounts.

The Act provides that 1 percent of GNP is to be paid from the Exchequer into the Fund each year. This contribution can be increased (but not decreased) by a Dáil (Lower House of Parliament) resolution. In addition, €6.5 billion, representing the proceeds of the sale of Telecom Éireann and contributions in respect of 1999 and 2000 were paid into the Fund on its inception.

**Assets and investments**

The total state contribution to the Fund at end-2007 was €15.2 billion. The 2008 budget provision is €1.69 billion. The value of the NPRF at end-2007 was €21.15 billion. The Fund is within the General Government sector for statistical purposes.

**Investment policy and strategy**

The NPRF is obliged by the Act to secure the optimal total financial return available at a

level of risk acceptable to it. The only constraints on its investment are that it may not invest in Irish Government securities or acquire a controlling interest in a company. The Commission’s investment strategy is founded on the expectation that equities and other real assets will outperform financial assets over the long term despite swings over short time periods. The Fund’s long-term investment horizon (no drawdown for at least 17 years) and strong cash flow mean that it can also exploit the additional return and diversification benefits available from holding less liquid assets such as property and private equity. The NPRF Commission is a signatory to the UN Principles for Responsible Investment and the Carbon Disclosure Project.

**Korea: Korea Investment Corporation****Goal and objective**

Korea Investment Corporation (KIC) was established in July 2005 under the KIC Act. It was launched with a mandate to manage public funds entrusted by the government and the Bank of Korea, by investing in a variety of financial assets in the international financial markets.

**How the fund is managed**

KIC has adopted a governance structure with the Steering Committee as the highest governing body in order to ensure autonomy and independent operation. The Steering Committee is currently composed of nine members including the committee chairman. Committee members include six professionals from the private sector, the CEO of KIC, and the heads of trust institutions that have entrusted assets exceeding one trillion won, namely the Minister of Strategy and Finance and the Governor of the Bank of Korea. Six private sector members, who are nominated by the Civil Member Candidate Nomination Committee and appointed by the President of Korea, serve two-year terms. The Chairman of the Steering Committee is elected from among the private sector members.

**Assets and Investment policy**

Initially entrusted to manage US\$20 billion for the Bank of Korea and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, KIC has, through the end of 2007, invested US\$14.8 billion of the whole entrusted amount. The asset classes that KIC may invest in include securities (stocks and bonds), foreign exchanges, and derivatives, as defined under the KIC Act. At present, KIC invests in asset classes that are specified in the investment management agreements between KIC and its clients.

KIC reports on its business activities to the National Assembly in accordance with the National Assembly Act and the Act on the Inspection and Investigation of State Administration, and is subject to annual inspections conducted by the National Assembly.

**Kuwait: Kuwait Investment Authority****History and origins**

The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) is the oldest sovereign wealth fund in the world. KIA traces its roots to the Kuwait Investment Board, which was established in 1953, eight years before Kuwait's independence.

In 1982, KIA was established to take over the responsibility of managing the assets of Kuwait from the Ministry of Finance. Today, the KIA manages two main funds: the General Reserve Fund (GRF) and the Future Generations Fund (FGF). The KIA may also manage any other funds entrusted to it by the Minister of Finance. The KIA is an asset manager, and does not own any of the assets it manages, all of which are owned by the State of Kuwait.

**Investment philosophy**

KIA's mission is to achieve a long-term investment return on the financial reserves entrusted by the State of Kuwait to the Kuwait Investment Authority by providing an alternative to oil reserves.

KIA's objectives are threefold: (1) KIA aims to achieve a rate of return on its investment

that, on a three-year rolling average, exceeds composite benchmarks by designing and maintaining an uncorrelated asset allocation, consistent with mandated return and risk objectives; (2) KIA endeavors to be a world class investment management organization committed to continuous improvement in the way it conducts business; and (3) KIA is committed to the excellence of the private sector in Kuwait, while ensuring that it does not compete with or substitute for it in any field.

**Source of funds**

KIA is responsible for the management and administration of Kuwait's General Reserve Fund (GRF) and its Future Generations Fund (FGF), as well as all other funds entrusted to it by the Minister of Finance for and on behalf of the State of Kuwait. The GRF is the repository of all of the State of Kuwait's oil revenues and income earned from GRF investments. The FGF was established in 1976 with 50 percent of the GRF balance, and each year 10 percent of all state revenues, including revenues of the GRF, are transferred to the FGF. KIA manages FGF assets for the benefit of future generations, permitting oil assets to be diversified into long-term financial investments.

**Structure and governance**

KIA is an independent public authority managed by its Board of Directors, the majority of whom must be from the private sector. The Managing Director is appointed by the Board of Directors from the private sector representatives. An Executive Committee of the Board is responsible for monitoring KIA's activities.

**Independent audits and review**

KIA's accounts are reviewed, audited, and approved by two of the world's leading external audit firms. In addition, KIA is required by law to submit semi-annual statements of its assets under management to the independent State Audit Bureau; KIA presents an annual statement of its accounts to the Council of Ministers (Kuwait's

Cabinet); the KIA presents an annual statement of its accounts to the National Assembly (Kuwait's Parliament); and the KIA appears before various committees at Parliament on a periodic basis to discuss KIA's performance. KIA's Board of Directors has an Audit Committee, with members from the private sector representative of the Board.

### **Risk management**

KIA's performance and risk management systems are the responsibility of KIA's Risk and Performance Unit, which reports directly to the Managing Director. The Risk and Performance Unit is responsible for conducting performance and risk analysis, identifying and communicating performance and risk issues to senior management, developing an understanding of performance and risk within KIA's investment sectors, and investigating data irregularities.

### **Libya: The Libyan Investment Authority**

*"The Libyan Investment Authority is committed to managing and developing the funds entrusted to it by employing the highest level of financial expertise to invest across a range of international markets and asset classes."*

**Executive Director, Mohamed H. Layas**

### **Goals and objectives**

The Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) was established in December 2006 and started operations in June 2007. It is mandated to manage the financial assets allocated to it by the State. The intention is to build a high quality and well-diversified investment portfolio in order to create a sustainable source of revenue, with a view to reducing dependency on oil.

Headquartered in Tripoli, the LIA has the authority, infrastructure, and depth in resources to enable it to achieve its mandate:

to be recognized as a world-class provider of investment management for the benefit of the Libyan state and the long-term future and well-being of its citizens.

### **Source of funds**

The LIA funds consolidated pre-existing funds such as the Libyan Foreign Investment Company, the Libyan African Investment Portfolio and Oilinvest Company. Oil revenues in excess of budgeted amounts are transferred to the LIA.

Today it is estimated that the LIA's fund is worth US\$50 billion. The state will increase the funds entrusted to the LIA to US\$70 billion before the end of 2008.

### **How the fund is managed**

The fund invests in assets on a commercial basis mostly abroad through reputable international managers. The LIA may, however, make direct investments domestically or internally through joint-ventures or with national or international strategic partners. These are likely to be in sectors and industries that are of critical importance to Libya's development.

Its organizational structure is being developed with assistance from international consultants. Its board of trustees includes the Prime Minister (Chairman), the Governor of the Central Bank, and the Minister of Planning, and its board of directors includes the Executive Director of the LIA, the Deputy Executive Director, and five Libyan investment professionals. The board of directors is advised by a committee of international financial experts.

An international consulting firm is helping the LIA develop a process for selecting and evaluating reputable investment managers for different asset classes.

### **Reporting and transparency**

LIA intends to meet high transparency standards and a new decree in 2008 requires that LIA publish annual reports on its website in both English and Arabic.

### **Mexico: Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund of Mexico**

#### **Goal and objectives**

In 2000, the Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund was constituted with a risk management purpose in response to the observed oil price decreases that led to unplanned budget cuts in the late 1990s. The objective of the Fund is to lessen the effects on public finances of changes in the level of oil revenues derived from sudden variations in international oil prices.

#### **Sources of funds**

The Fund's inflow comes from a special levy on oil revenues and 40 percent of excess revenues, when the observed oil price is higher than the one set in the budget. Also, it has an upper limit defined by the level of oil production platform.

The resources of the Fund are used to compensate for a decrease in estimated income from the levies of the related fiscal year derived from a lower observed oil price, using up to 50 percent of the accumulated resources at the end of the previous the fiscal year for that purpose. The operation of the Fund and the allocation of resources are audited by the Superior Auditor of the Federation, and reports are sent to Congress on a quarterly basis.

#### **Investment policy**

The investment policy of the Fund is set by a Technical Committee, which aims at an adequate level of liquidity required for the purpose of the Fund and a reasonable rate of return with a minimum risk level. The Technical Committee is composed of representatives of the Ministry of Finance.

### **New Zealand: The New Zealand Superannuation Fund**

#### **Goals, objectives, and investments**

The New Zealand Superannuation Fund was established under the New Zealand Superannuation and Retirement Income Act

2001. It is a Crown-owned fund financed by capital contributions from the Government, to assist future governments to meet the cost of providing retirement income to New Zealanders.

An aging population means the cost of providing New Zealand superannuation is expected to double over the next 50 years. To prepare for this, the Government plans to allocate around NZ\$1.5 billion a year to the Fund over the next 20 years while the cost of superannuation is relatively low. In the meantime, the Fund will invest the money on a prudent but commercial basis. As the cost of superannuation escalates, the Government will progressively draw on the Fund to help smooth the impact on its finances.

The Fund commenced investing at the end of September 2003. As of May 31, 2008, the value of the Fund was NZ\$14.7 billion. The Fund is expected to grow to around NZ\$109 billion by 2025, making it one of the largest funds in Australasia.

The Fund is governed by a separate Crown entity called the Guardians of New Zealand Superannuation (Guardians). This entity is overseen by a Board selected by the Minister of Finance for their skills and experience.

While accountable to the Crown, the Guardians operate at arm's length from the Crown. The Guardians are charged with managing and administering the Fund's assets in a prudent, commercial manner.

#### **How the fund is managed**

The Guardians must manage the Fund in a manner consistent with best-practice management portfolio, maximizing return without undue risk to the Fund as a whole, and avoiding prejudice to New Zealand's reputation as a responsible member of the world community. They are required to publish an annual Statement of Intent setting out their organizational objectives for the following three years and their Annual Report must measure performance against those objectives. In addition they are required to prepare, keep updated, and publish a

Statement of Investment Policies, Standards and Procedures. Each of those public documents, together with more information about the Guardians and the Fund, can be found on the Fund's website, [www.nzsuperfund.co.nz](http://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz).

## **Norway: Government Pension Fund**

### ***Incorporation and objectives***

The Government Pension Fund was established by the Pension Fund Act in 2006 to support the long-term management of petroleum revenues and facilitate the government's accumulation of financial assets in order to help cope with large, future financial commitments associated with an ageing population. The Fund consists of the Government Pension Fund – Global (formerly known as the Petroleum Fund, established in 1990) and the Government Pension Fund – Norway (formerly known as Folketrygdfondet, established in 1967).

The Pension Fund – Global's inflow consists of all state petroleum revenues, net financial transactions related to petroleum activities, as well as the return on the Fund's investments. The outflow from the Fund is the sum needed to cover the non-oil budget deficit. The Fund is thus fully integrated with the state budget and net allocations to the Fund reflect the total budget surplus (including petroleum revenues). Fiscal policy, which regulates the outflow from the Fund, is anchored in a guideline where the structural, non-oil budget deficit shall over time correspond to the real return on the Fund, estimated at 4 percent.

### ***Investment policy***

The Fund is invested globally in a large number of financial instruments in order to get a broad diversification and achieve good investment returns with moderate financial risk. The Fund is a pure financial investor with a diversified portfolio of minority holdings in a wide range of companies. The Fund's strategic benchmark portfolio consists of 60 percent equities, 35 percent fixed

income instruments, and 5 percent real estate investments (in process of being established).

### ***Governance arrangement***

The governance structure of the Fund is marked by a clear division of responsibilities between the political authorities and the operational management. Under the Pension Fund Act, the Ministry of Finance is the formal owner of the Fund. The Ministry has formulated the investment strategy by setting a benchmark with risk limits. Within these limits, there is full delegation of operational management to Norges Bank. The Bank manages parts of the funds internally, while parts are managed by external managers appointed by the Bank on a commercial basis. As formal owner of the assets, Norges Bank is also charged with exercising the Fund's ownership rights.

### ***Ethical guidelines***

The Fund has a set of ethical guidelines that are based on two elements: to ensure that a reasonable portion of the country's petroleum wealth benefits future generations, and to not make investments which constitute an unacceptable risk that the Fund may contribute to unethical acts or omissions. To implement the ethical guidelines, the following mechanisms are employed: (i) achieve high returns subject to moderate risk; (ii) exercise the ownership rights associated with the equity holdings (done by Norges Bank); and (iii) exclude some companies from the investment universe (decided by the Ministry based on advice from Council on Ethics).

### ***Accountability***

The management of the Fund is characterized by a high degree of transparency and disclosure of information. The Ministry reports to Parliament and the public on all important matters relating to the Fund. Norges Bank publishes quarterly reports on the management of the Fund, as well as an annual report and an annual listing of all investments. At the end of 2007, the Fund's

value stood at NOK 2,019 billion, or US\$373 billion.

The Government Pension Fund – Norway originates primarily from surpluses in the national insurance accounts from the introduction of the National Insurance Scheme in 1967 and until the late 1970s. The return on the assets is added to the Fund. There are no transfers between the fiscal budget and the Fund, nor are there any transfers of capital between the Pension Fund – Global and the Pension Fund – Norway. Equities account for 60 percent and fixed income instruments for 40 percent of the Pension Fund – Norway’s strategic benchmark, with 85 percent allocated to Norway and the remaining 15 percent to Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. The governance structure and transparency arrangements are similar to that of the Pension Fund – Global. The Ministry of Finance represents the owner and sets the benchmark with risk limits, while there is full delegation of operational management of the Pension Fund – Norway to the state-owned asset manager Folketrygdfondet. At the end of 2007, the Fund’s value stood at NOK 117 billion, or US\$21 billion.

### **Qatar: Qatar Investment Authority**

#### **Establishment and ownership**

Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) was established in 2005 by virtue of the Emiri Decision No (22) of 2005 as an independent government investment institution and went into operation in early 2006.

QIA is wholly owned and subject to supervision by the Government of the State of Qatar and pursuant to Article (2) of QIA’s constituent instrument, namely said Emiri Decision, QIA has a legal personality and a budget, both of which are independent of those of the Government of the State of Qatar. Said provisions together with other provisions of the above-mentioned Decision as well as those of other Emiri Decisions and QIA Board resolutions provide for

separation of roles and responsibilities among the owner, the governing entity, and the management.

According to its constitutive instrument, QIA’s objectives are to develop, invest, and manage the state reserve funds and other property assigned to it by the Government via the Supreme Council of Economic Affairs and Investments. The above mentioned Emiri Decision endowed QIA with required capacity, powers, and competences to act in fulfilling its statutory mandate and achieve its objectives.

#### **Governing body**

QIA’s Board of Directors is the supreme body, having full control over its affairs and the discharge of its business. The Board consists of a Chairman, a Vice Chairman, and a number of members who are appointed in accordance with said Emiri Decision. QIA’s Board meets regularly and as required, for setting out and review of QIA’s strategic policy in accordance with the objectives provided for in its constitutive instrument. QIA’s Board does not normally engage itself in the decisions relating to day-to-day business, as those are assigned by the Emiri Decision to the Chief Executive Officer and the management.

#### **Management**

QIA’s Chief Executive Officer is responsible for the internal control of QIA, management of its affairs, and the implementation of its general policy. To carry out these functions, he is assisted by a management team including an investment committee and business departments, covering, *inter alia*, direct investment in real estate and private equity, supported by internal audit, legal, administration, and finance departments. In addition to the existing regulations, policies, and procedures, QIA is currently engaging a number of specialist companies to update the same and prepare comprehensive systems and sets of manuals involving codes, policies, and procedures pertaining to corporate governance, code of conduct, legal policies,

investment approval process, risk management and investment strategy, operations, and the like.

### **Russia: Reserve Fund and National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation**

#### ***Incorporation and objectives***

The Reserve Fund (RF) and National Wealth Fund (NWF) were established in accordance with the amendments to the Budget Code, the federal law of the Russian Federation, approved in 2007. The initial transfers to the RF and NWF were executed on January 30, 2008, from the Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation, whereupon it ceased to exist. As of that date the size of the RF and NWF totaled US\$125.40 billion and US\$31.98 billion, respectively. As of August 1, 2008, the RF totaled US\$129.68 billion and the NWF totaled US\$32.69 billion.

The objective of the RF is to ensure that the federal budget expenses are financed and the federal budget balance is maintained. In case the amount of oil and gas revenues is not sufficient for the budget purposes, an additional amount could be withdrawn from the RF. The RF could also be used for early state foreign debt repayment in compliance with the federal budget law for the corresponding fiscal year. Actually the RF has replaced the Stabilization Fund. The amount of the RF is limited to 10 percent of GDP. That means that this sum is sufficient to meet future budget obligations in case of unfavorable conditions for a period of at least three years.

The objectives of the NWF are to co-finance voluntary pension savings of the Russian citizens and to maintain the budget balance of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation. The NWF assets could not be used for any other purposes.

#### ***Accumulation***

The budget proceeds from the mineral extraction tax and export duties on oil, gas, and oil products are accounted separately

from other proceeds to the budget. As the oil and gas proceeds are withdrawn from the budget the artificial budget deficit appears. This calculated non-oil deficit should be covered by the transfer, which amount is pegged to GDP: 6.1 percent in 2008, 5.5 percent in 2009, 4.5 percent in 2010, and 3.7 percent from 2011. The oil and gas proceeds in excess of the transfer are to be channeled to the RF until its amount reaches 10 percent of GDP. If after all there is an excessive amount of oil and gas revenues, then it will be channeled to the NWF.

#### ***Governance structure***

The Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation manages the RF and NWF. Some functions of asset management of the RF might be delegated to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia) in accordance with agreement with the Ministry of Finance. As for the NWF, some functions of asset management might be delegated to the Bank of Russia or specialized financial institutions (external managers).

#### ***Investment policy***

The primary investment objective of the RF and NWF is to ensure safety of the assets and stable level of return.

The RF assets are to be invested in foreign currency and the following asset classes, nominated in foreign currency:

- foreign debt securities issued by foreign governments;
- foreign debt securities issued by foreign agencies and central banks;
- foreign debt securities of international financial institutions;
- deposits in foreign banks and credit organizations; and
- deposits and account balances with the Bank of Russia.

The NWF assets are to be invested in financial instruments eligible for the RF and also in:

- fixed income securities and equities of legal entities;
- shares in investment funds; and
- deposits in Russian banks and credit organizations.

Currency composition for both Funds stayed the same as it was for the Stabilization Fund: USD—45 percent, EUR—45 percent, GBP—10 percent.

Current asset allocation for the RF and NWF is the following:

- foreign debt securities issued by foreign governments—80 percent;
- foreign debt securities issued by foreign agencies and central banks—15 percent;
- foreign debt securities of international financial institutions—5 percent

The issuer shall have a long-term credit rating not lower than AA-level.

The investment horizon is limited by minimum maturity for debt securities of three months and maximum maturity of three years for debt securities nominated in USD and EUR, and five years for debt securities nominated in GBP.

Currently the RF and NWF are not invested in eligible assets directly and external managers are not used. The Ministry of Finance places both Funds on the banking accounts in the Bank of Russia in USD, EUR, and GBP. Under the banking account agreement, the Bank of Russia should pay the Ministry interest equal to the performance of the total return indices, composed from the eligible asset classes in accordance with the requirements mentioned above.

At present, the NWF assets should be invested in the same financial instruments as RF. The reason is that investments in corporate securities require development of necessary legal and technical infrastructure. In accordance with instructions from the Government of the Russian Federation the Ministry of Finance is drafting proposals on

the NWF's organizational framework and investment strategy.

### **Reporting and audit**

RF and NWF have separate Federal Treasury accounts with the Bank of Russia. The Ministry of Finance should report every quarter to the Government on accumulation, investment, and spending of the capital of both Funds as a part of the Ministry's report on budget execution. In turn, the Government should report quarterly on the same items to the both chambers of the Russian Parliament—the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (the State Duma and the Federation Council). At the beginning of every month, the Ministry of Finance should publish a report in the mass media on the accumulation, spending, balance, and investment operations of the RF and NWF.

The accumulation, spending, and investment operations of the RF and NWF are audited annually by the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, an independent statutory auditor, established by the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

### **Singapore: Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Pte Ltd**

#### **Incorporation**

The Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Pte Ltd (GIC) was incorporated in 1981 under the Singapore Companies Act and is wholly owned by the Government of Singapore. The Government, through its Investment Mandate to GIC, has authorized GIC as its agent to manage Singapore's foreign reserves. The government is the owner of the reserves.

#### **Source and purpose of funds**

The sources of the Government's funds are its accumulated national savings and sustained balance of payments surpluses. GIC's mission is to preserve and enhance the purchasing power of these reserves, which may be called upon during times of crisis. The returns on

the investment of these reserves also contribute toward the Government's budgetary needs.

### **Governance**

The Ministry of Finance, as representative of the Government in dealing with GIC, provides GIC with an investment mandate that sets out the investment objective, time horizon, risk parameters, and investment guidelines for managing the portfolio. The Government does not direct or interfere in GIC's investment decisions.

The Government ensures that a competent board of directors is in place and holds the GIC Board accountable for its overall portfolio performance. GIC is additionally accountable to an independent Elected President of Singapore,<sup>43</sup> who is empowered under the Constitution of Singapore to provide a custodial role over the country's reserves. The President also has to concur with any appointment or removal of directors from the GIC Board, to ensure that each director is a person with integrity and competence.

The GIC Board sets the asset allocation policy and reviews the performance of the portfolio. The GIC management executes the investment strategies and is responsible for all investment transactions. It has full autonomy on where and how to invest the portfolio within the asset allocation approved by the Board. Three asset management subsidiaries—GIC Asset Management Pte Ltd, GIC Real Estate Pte Ltd, and GIC Special Investments Pte Ltd—are responsible for investing the portfolio in the asset classes under their charge and within the guidelines set out in the Investment Mandate.

<sup>43</sup>The President cannot hold other constitutional office nor may he be a member of any political party. He is also required under his oath of office to discharge his functions without regard to any previous affiliation with any political party.

### **Reporting and audit**

GIC reports to the Accountant General's department of the Ministry of Finance on a monthly and quarterly basis, with detailed information on the performance, risk, and distribution of the portfolio. Once a year, GIC management meets the ministry formally to review the risk and performance of the portfolio in the preceding financial year. The Government portfolio is audited annually by the Auditor-General of Singapore, who is appointed by the elected President of Singapore.

### **Investment and risk management**

GIC invests only for financial returns. GIC invests in equities, fixed income, foreign exchange, commodities, money markets, alternative investments, real estate, and private equity. With a network of eight offices in key financial capitals around the world, it invests in more than 40 markets worldwide and in a variety of investments and securities.

Risk management and control forms a critical part of the company's investment management activities. It protects the portfolio against catastrophic losses. The company places great emphasis on risk awareness and a strong governance framework run by people of high integrity. The risk management framework includes policies which cover a wide spectrum of risks such as credit risks, market risks, operational risks, counterparty risks, and legal and regulatory risks.

Detailed information on GIC's governance framework, investment processes, asset mix, and long-term returns are available at [www.gic.com.sg](http://www.gic.com.sg).

### **Singapore: Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited**

#### **Incorporation and purpose**

Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited (Temasek) was incorporated in 1974 under the Singapore Companies Act and is wholly

owned by the Government of Singapore. Then, Temasek was established to hold and manage investments in companies previously held directly by the Singapore Government. The Government transferred these investments to Temasek in order for them to be managed on a commercial basis as a company and to focus on its responsibilities of policy making for the economy. Today, Temasek's mission is to create and maximize sustainable shareholder value as an active investor and shareholder of successful enterprises.

#### **Source of funds**

Temasek is an investment company that owns and manages its assets. Temasek's investments are funded through dividends received from its portfolio companies, divestment proceeds, commercial borrowings, a maiden Yankee bond issue in 2005 and occasional capital injections from its shareholder, the Singapore Government. Temasek does not manage Singapore's foreign exchange reserves. Temasek has a corporate credit rating of AAA/Aaa by Standard & Poor's and Moody's, respectively.

#### **Governance**

Temasek is an autonomously managed and professional investment house guided by an independent board. A majority of Temasek's directors are from the private sector. Temasek's investment, divestment, and other operational decisions are made by the Board and management, independent of the Singapore Government.

The Singapore Government ensures that a competent board of directors is in place and holds them accountable. Temasek is additionally accountable to an independent Elected President of Singapore, who is empowered under the Constitution of Singapore to provide a custodial role over the country's reserves. The President also has to concur with any appointment or removal of directors from the Temasek Board, to ensure that each director is a person with integrity and competence.

#### **Reporting and audit**

Temasek provides annual statutory financial statements audited by an international audit firm, as well as periodic updates, to the Singapore Ministry of Finance, with detailed information on the performance and risk. Temasek pays dividends to its shareholder regularly, and like other commercial companies, Temasek pays taxes wherever it operates.

#### **Investment and risk management**

Temasek has flexible investment horizons and the option of taking concentrated positions or remaining in cash. Its four investment themes—"Transforming economies," "Thriving middle class," "Deepening comparative advantages," and "Emerging champions"—serve as its guiding principles. Temasek's portfolio stands at S\$185 billion and is spread across Singapore, the rest of Asia, and the OECD markets.

Temasek is an investor in diverse industries covering banking and financial services, real estate, transportation and logistics, infrastructure, telecommunications and media, bioscience and healthcare, education, consumer and lifestyle, energy and resources, engineering, and technology.

Inclusive of dividends distributed, and net of any new capital, Temasek's total shareholder return is more than 18 percent compounded annually since inception.

Companies in its portfolio are managed by their respective management, and guided and supervised by their respective boards. Temasek does not direct the commercial or operational decisions of its portfolio companies, but holds their respective boards accountable for the financial performance of their companies. It will exercise its shareholder rights, including voting, to protect its commercial interests.

Temasek has a multinational staff of some 350 and international offices in China, India, Brazil, and Vietnam, and a compensation framework aligned toward sustainable long-term value creation.

Temasek's risk-management framework covers strategic issues, including funding liquidity risk and structured foreign exchange risk; financial risks such as investment risks, market risks, and credit risk; and operational risks.

Detailed information on Temasek's financial performance, investments, governance framework, compensation, risk management, and community engagements are published for the public in the annual *Temasek Review*, available at [www.temasekholdings.com.sg](http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg).

#### **Timor-Leste: Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund**

The Republic of Timor-Leste established a Petroleum Fund in 2005 under the Petroleum Fund Law 09/2005. The Petroleum Fund shall contribute to a prudent and transparent management of the petroleum resources for the benefit of both current and future generations and sound fiscal policy.

According to the law, the Government is the overall manager of the Fund, while the Banking and Payments Authority (BPA) is the operational manager.

As of June 30, 2008, the Petroleum Fund's balance was US\$3.2 billion and the monthly revenues to the Fund are currently estimated at approximately US\$200 million. Based on prudent assumptions, the Fund's closing balances at year-end 2008 and 2010 are estimated at US\$3.3 billion and US\$5.8 billion, respectively.

The Petroleum Fund Law requires that not less than 90 percent of the portfolio be invested in debt instruments and deposits denominated in U.S. dollars. Not more than 10 percent of the portfolio may be invested in other financial instruments, provided that the instruments are issued abroad, are liquid and transparent, and are traded in a financial market of the highest regulatory standard.

The current investment mandate defined in the Management Agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the BPA is to invest the portfolio in debt instruments issued by the United States and other qualifying sovereign

governments. The performance is measured against the benchmark Merrill Lynch 0–5-year government bond index. So far, the investments have only taken place in U.S. government bonds.

The Government is responsible for establishing the overall policies and guidelines for the investment of the capital of the Fund, within the framework of the current Petroleum Fund Law, including the specific asset allocation strategy, the investment mandate given to the operational manager, comprising an overall mandate and eventually any subsidiary mandates to external and/or internal managers, with such benchmarks, financial targets, performance and risk measures as may be necessary to convey the Ministry of Finance's intentions to the BPA for the investment and anticipated return on the Fund.

Taking into account the size of the Petroleum Fund and the fact that the balance of the Fund is growing rapidly, the Government is reviewing the current legal framework, including the investment strategy and eligible instruments, with the aim of diversifying the portfolio into other asset classes, currencies, and regions than the current law permits, subject to certain risk limits.

#### **Trinidad and Tobago: The Heritage and Stabilization Fund**

##### **Establishment**

The Heritage and Stabilization Fund (HSF) was established in March 2007 by an Act of Parliament, Act 6 of 2007.

##### **Source of funds**

The HSF is a long-term fund that has two distinct elements: a stabilization component to insulate fiscal policy from fluctuations in energy sector revenues, and a savings component for future generations. More emphasis will be placed on the savings component of this Fund. The accumulation of foreign exchange in the Fund derives from the proceeds of exports of oil and natural gas.

The Fund is separate from the overall foreign exchange reserves of Trinidad and Tobago.

#### **Ownership of the fund**

The HSF is owned by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago and managed by an independent board, composed of one representative each from the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank and three representatives from the private sector. The Board delegates operational management to the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago and the Bank uses external fund managers to manage part of the portfolio.

#### **Assets under management**

As of August 23, 2008, the HSF amounted to US\$2,400 million.

#### **Investment policy and asset allocation**

The HSF is invested exclusively in foreign currency denominated assets with a medium-to long-term focus. The Board decides on the investment objectives of the Fund, on strategic asset allocations, and on the benchmark portfolio. The Bank manages the Fund to achieve a target rate of return. The Fund is to be invested in fixed income securities and equities.

#### **Report of the HSF activities**

The Central Bank reports on a quarterly basis to the Board of the HSF, while the Board reports to the Minister of Finance annually. The Minister of Finance reports to Parliament on an annual basis after an independent audit by the Auditor General.

#### **Relations between the HSF and the budget**

The Act requires that 60 percent of the excess tax revenue from oil and gas (the difference between the actual and the budget estimate) be transferred into the HSF on an annual basis. The oil and gas prices to be used for the budget estimate take into account the recent price history as well as projected prices obtained from defined international sources.

### **United Arab Emirates: Abu Dhabi Investment Authority**

#### **Ownership**

Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) is a public institution established in 1976 by the Government of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi as an independent government investment institution. ADIA replaced the Financial Investments Board created in 1967 (part of the then Abu Dhabi Ministry of Finance).

ADIA is wholly owned and subject to supervision by the Abu Dhabi Government and has an independent legal identity with full capacity to act in fulfilling its statutory mandate and objectives. ADIA's current constitutive document is Law No. (5) of 1981 Concerning the Re-organization of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. Law No. (5) provides separation of roles and responsibilities among the owner, the governing entity, and the management.

ADIA's Law (5) objective is "to receive funds of the Government of Abu Dhabi allocated for investment, and invest and reinvest those funds in the public interest of the Emirate in such a way so as to make available the necessary financial resources to secure and maintain the future welfare of the Emirate."

Abu Dhabi is one of seven Emirates comprising the sovereign federal state of the United Arab Emirates (UAE or Union). Each Emirate exercises sovereignty over all matters that are not within the assigned jurisdiction of the Union government. In particular, under the UAE Constitution, the natural resources and wealth in each Emirate is the public property of that Emirate. Consequently, the natural resources and wealth of Abu Dhabi are considered essential to the economic prosperity, well-being, and security of its citizens.

#### **Governing body**

ADIA's Board of Directors is the supreme body having absolute control over its affairs and the discharge of its business. The Board is composed of a Chairman, Vice Chairman,

Managing Director, and other Board members, all of whom are senior Government officials appointed by a Decree of the Ruler of the Emirate. ADIA's Board of Directors meets periodically as required for establishment and review of ADIA's strategic policy in accordance with Law (5) objectives and its oversight of ADIA. ADIA's Board does not normally involve itself in ADIA's investment and operational decisions, as the Managing Director is assigned these responsibilities by Law (5).

### **Management**

ADIA's Managing Director is the chief executive responsible for the implementation of its policy, the management of its affairs, and the legal representative of ADIA in its relationship with third parties. The Managing Director is vested by Law (5) with financial independence and various powers, including the power to take decisions in respect of investment proposals following review and analysis in context of the policies approved by the Board within the Law's objectives. Thus, ADIA's management has operational independence from general government.

ADIA's Managing Director is assisted by the Investment Committee established pursuant to Law (5), which is composed mainly of the heads of the several investment departments. The Investment Committee assists the Managing Director in the performance of his duties and provides advice in respect of ADIA's investments and the management and coordination of ADIA's affairs and activities. The Investment Committee is supported by a number of advisory committees: the Strategy Committee, the Administration Committee, and the Guidelines Committee. The Managing Director is also supported by the Strategy Unit, Evaluation and Follow-up Department, Internal Audit Department, and Legal Division.

### **United States of America: Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation**

The Alaska Permanent Fund was created by the people of Alaska in 1976 to save a portion

of the state's oil revenue for the future. The Fund is currently worth about US\$37 billion.

In 1980, the Alaska State Legislature created the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation to manage the investments of the Permanent Fund outside of the State Treasury. The investments are guided by a six-member board of trustees, appointed by the Governor.

The Trustees have maintained a conservative asset mix over the years. The current asset allocation includes 53 percent in U.S., non-U.S., and global equities, 22 percent in U.S. and non-U.S. fixed income, and 10 percent in real estate. The Fund also has allocations of 6 percent to private equity, 6 percent to absolute return strategy investments, and 3 percent to infrastructure investments.

The Permanent Fund is made up of two parts: reserved (principal) and unreserved assets. The Constitution does not allow the reserved portion of the Fund to be spent. The Alaska State Legislature may spend the unreserved part of the Fund as it chooses.

Prior to 2005, the Legislature had only used the earnings of the Fund for one purpose: the Permanent Fund Dividend program (administered by the Department of Revenue). This program annually distributes a portion of the unreserved assets to every eligible Alaskan. These dividends have ranged from US\$331 in 1984 to US\$1,964 in 2000. In the fall of 2008, dividends of approximately US\$2,000 will be paid to more than 600,000 Alaskans.

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